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
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
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THE QUEST FOR REGIME LEGITIMACY
AND STABILITY IN THE GDR: THE
DETERMINANT OF POLICY

by

Mark N. Gose

September 1986

Thesis Advisor:

Patrick J. Garrity

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The Quest For Regime Legitimacy and Stability
In the GDR:
The Determinant of Policy

by

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of World War II, the German Democratic Republic has been forced to confront the circumstances of its creation and existence as the "other Germany", and its leaders determine policy with this in mind. Consequently, the ruling Socialist Unity Party must constantly strive to attain domestic legitimacy and stability for itself. This quest has acted, and continues to act, as a major determinant of East German foreign and domestic policies -- policies which sometimes differ from those of the USSR. Therefore, this paper analyzes the means by which the SED regime attempts to attain domestic legitimacy, and hence stability, for itself.

First, domestic policies designed to achieve legitimacy/stability goals are outlined. These include political culture, party recruitment, political socialization, and social policy. Second, the role of economics in attaining regime legitimacy is explored and shown to be another major implement. Third, East German relations with the Soviet Union, West Germany, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World are discussed in the context of six issues. These issues serve to illustrate the dominance of legitimacy and stability concerns in East German foreign policy. The last section of this paper discusses American policies relative to Central Europe; the SED's quest for legitimacy and stability is found to affect American decisionmaking in the region -- in past, present, and future policies.

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I. INTRODUCTION

There are few countries in the modern world where the mutual relationship between foreign and domestic policies is more important than in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). These policies have been governed by two important and elusive requirements: *the quest for legitimacy* and *the maintenance of regime stability*. Their importance to the East German leadership derives from the fact that there are two Germanies, which are a product of the East-West confrontation. It is my contention that these concerns have been the primary motivators in autonomous East German policy decisions and political posture throughout the short history of the GDR -- that is, policies formulated in East Berlin and not Moscow. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the East German Socialist Unity Party's (SED's) search for legitimacy and stability -- a search which functions as a major determinant of policy.

Unlike other communist states in Eastern Europe, the ruling SED regime is faced with the need to attain legitimacy as a government *and* legitimacy as a new German nation. How can a country which was conquered and thereafter occupied by the Soviets, with its government set up along Marxist/Leninist lines and its foreign policy historically controlled by Moscow, pretend to be a legitimate German state? In Jonathon Steele's words, "In the Western world it was considered a bastard state, an artificial satellite of the Soviet Union."¹ This is the paradox which has confronted the leaders of the regime, and as this paper will show, has served as a major influence on policymaking.

Long perceived as merely the Soviet Occupation Zone or the premier puppet state of the USSR, East Germany has today become an increasingly influential nation in the world and a politically viable actor in Central Europe. In 1973, this country became the one hundred and thirty-third member of the United Nations; just five years before, only thirteen countries officially viewed the GDR as a separate state. To be sure, the Soviet Union remains the ultimate power overseeing the final policies of the GDR; however, the political spectrum in which the SED leadership can function has grown wider. The resulting changes and subtle increases in autonomy for the East

¹Jonathon Steele, *Inside East Germany: The State That Came in From the Cold* (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 3.

Germans have affected domestic rule, intra-bloc foreign policy, and East-West relations.

A. METHODOLOGY

To illustrate the importance of legitimacy and stability in East German decisionmaking, different domestic and foreign policies are examined and their relationship to legitimacy/stability concerns are analyzed.

Chapter 2 deals with the domestic policies of the SED in addressing its legitimacy and stability concerns -- policies which demonstrate the tremendous energies and resources expended in the attempt to attain even limited success in this regard. The nature of East German political culture, political organization, socialization processes, party recruitment, and social policy, reflect SED attempts at legitimation and stabilization of the status quo. This influences not only the nature of policymaking in the GDR, but determines the kind of society which now exists there.

The third chapter of this paper addresses the Socialist Unity Party's use of economics as a tool for gaining legitimacy. The East German economic heritage is discussed in order to illustrate the problems which have confronted the GDR (and the solutions which have been applied to correct them). Standards of living and levels of personal consumption are compared to other similar nations in Eastern Europe in order to illustrate that economics is utilized to build popular support for the regime.

Chapter 4 explores legitimacy and stability as motivations in East German foreign relations. Four legitimacy/stability goals which motivate foreign policy decisions are discussed -- that is, those legitimacy/stability goals which, if perceived as vital by the SED leadership, could have possibly affected the final actions taken or decisions adopted. These goals are arranged in a matrix and rated as either high or low as motivators or factors in each situation. These legitimacy/stability (L,S) goals are:

- 1) *National Identity Goals*- Goals which would contribute to the overall perception of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
- 2) *Sovereignty Goals*- Objectives which motivate policies that tend to illustrate the GDR as a separate German nation recognized in the international milieu as such.
- 3) *Ideological Goals*- These are goals which illustrate the inherent "rightness" of the East German social and political system.
- 4) *Social Goals*- Goals which affect those policies aimed at building popular support through maintenance of consumer satisfaction and fulfillment of popular expectations of an ever-rising standard of living.

Also within this chapter, East German relationships with the Soviet Union, West Germany, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World are examined. First, the nature of the GDR's position in each of these relationships is briefly explored and, second, the L/S goals are applied to related issues. These issues are:

1) *GDR-Soviet-West German Issues*

Ostpolitik- The dispute between SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht and the Kremlin over detente with the West in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

Abgrenzung- the policy of limiting Western influences -- a policy implemented by Honecker and the SED leadership after detente became a reality.

"Damage Limitation"- East German maintenance of close ties with the Federal Republic of Germany after the deployment of American intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe in 1983; actions which were contrary to Soviet political posturing towards the West.

2) *GDR-East European Issues*

Czechoslovakia-1968- The policy and posture of the GDR in the period just prior to the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and after the "Prague Spring" in 1968.

Poland-1980-81- SED actions during the worker strikes and crisis in Poland beginning in August 1980.

3) *The GDR and the Third World*- The nature of the extensive East German involvement in various Third World countries -- countries both inside and outside of the "socialist camp."

The legitimacy/stability goals active in these issues are determined to be major influencing factors in East German foreign policy.

The fifth chapter outlines the United States policies in Central Europe and their relationship with the attainment of East German legitimacy and stability goals. A history of American interests in East Germany is briefly examined, and those which remain important today are analyzed. This is accomplished by comparing the three major American national interests (world order interests, economic interests, and ideological interests) to the East German L/S goals in order to illustrate the constraints which the United States must face in developing policies in Central Europe. Lastly, policy options are posited using this paradigm.

B. LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY DEFINED

The *Dictionary of Political Thought* defines legitimacy as:

The process whereby power gains acceptance for itself in the eyes of those who are governed by it, by generating a belief in its legitimacy . . . in communist

states legitimation tends to persist (despite the official view that, after the revolution, it will no longer be necessary), but, has the novel character of issuing directly from the state, in the form of doctrine.²

Therefore, in the East German sense, legitimacy can be defined in terms of the perception (by the populace) of credibility: credibility as a government, a social system, and a nation. Given the circumstances of the creation of the GDR, the Western concept of legality (emanating from popular mandate and considered an important aspect of legitimacy) is discarded in a state such as East Germany in favor of acquiescence and partial support by the populace. In the GDR, legitimacy can be claimed by the leadership, but in reality it can only truly exist if granted (perceived) by the East German people. It is identified and hence realized in many ways -- through popular support and compliance, the realization of a sense of national sovereignty and pride by the people, increased East German patriotism (as different from an overall German patriotism), and, above all, the tacit acceptance of the SED regime by the East German population.

Legitimacy is important in the German Democratic Republic for two major reasons. First, legitimacy assists in bolstering the domestic political stability of the ruling party -- stability which is derived from *domestically* perceived legitimacy. This is accomplished by creating a sense of confidence not only in the polity itself, but also in the ideology which is the polity's foundation. Second, legitimacy aids in attaining those *foreign* policy goals which contribute to the above. Given the circumstances of the creation and development of the GDR, a legitimate government (in the East German sense) possesses greater flexibility in realizing political, social, and economic success than a government which appears to be based solely on coercion.

Regime stability, on the other hand, is the maintenance of political power and control by the Marxist/Leninist government in East Berlin. Stephen Bowers considers stability:

... a function of numerous factors: the extent to which citizen expectations are satisfied, popular identification with the system, and acceptance of governmental legitimacy are but a few of the most obvious. Compliance with laws is yet another component in the catalogue of indicators of regime stability.³

²Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1982), pp 264-265.

³Stephen R. Bowers, "Law and Lawlessness in a Socialist Society: The Potential Impact of Crime in East Germany," *World Affairs* 145 (Fall 1982), p. 152.

Stability is also evident in the absence of widespread dissent and threats of counterrevolution, continued economic viability, total control over all aspects of society, and recently, at least partial support for the political structure on the part of the population.

While stability is the ultimate objective for which legitimacy is sought and created, there remains a mutual relationship between both factors. In other words, the long term goal is always stability; although some periodic systemic instability may be required to "fine-tune" or eliminate dangerous deviation (i.e., the Berlin Wall or massive economic reform). Because of the mutual influence of legitimacy and stability, they will be treated throughout this analysis as a single factor unless differences are emphasized.

II. THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTS

A. INTRODUCTION

East German domestic policies are dominated by the necessity to maintain regime stability and build legitimacy for the State and the Party. Consequently, the regime places great importance on the transformation of the society in order to realize these goals. It seems that every aspect of the social system has been included, with varying success, in the creation of the "perfect state."

Political culture assists in addressing the legitimacy problem through the establishment of an ideological foundation and political structure in order to create support for the socialist regime. Political recruitment policies emphasize incorporation of talent and expertise to build popular advocacy through efficiency and results. The socialization process seeks to create a "new German" in the GDR to address the legitimacy deficit through education, social structure, and propaganda. Lastly, overall social policies attempt to satisfy as many of the wants and needs of the population as is politically and ideologically feasible.

B. POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Peter Merkl defines political culture as:

... internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are inducted into it just as they are socialized into nonpolitical roles and social systems. . . . The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.⁴

This orientation toward the political structure of the nation enables, to a certain degree, some identification with the system by the average citizen, i.e., where the system has been and where it is going. In this respect, one of the most important ways to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the governed is to put forth a logical and explainable ideology. Ideology provides a frame of reference to lend continuity and purpose to that political structure which is attempting to administer and control the nation. In this regard, the official ideology of the German Democratic Republic is based on the

⁴Peter Merkl, *Modern Comparative Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), p. 149.

Soviet pattern (Marxism/Leninism). Formulated from the writings of Marx, Lenin, and to some extent, Engels, Marxism/Leninism posits basic assumptions about man -- his beliefs, history, and the universe per se. The aspects of class struggle and proletarian revolution, the overview of historical development and dialectic, and Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat are all integral parts of the political basis for rule of the Socialist Unity Party in East Germany. Thus, the foundation for communist rule in the GDR is predicated upon the "science" of Marxism/Leninism, and consequently, utilized by the regime to instill a sense of correctness and continuity to the SED system.

The development of the political culture of East Germany is divided into three periods by John Starrels and Anita Mallinckrodt.⁵

- 1) The "Anti-Fascist Democratic Revolution" (1945-49).
- 2) Transition to the Construction of Socialism (1950-61).
- 3) Developing Socialism (1962-present).

1945-1949- The first phase consisted of anti-fascist programs to de-nazify the Soviet Occupation Zones. The period between 1945 and 1949 was the formative stage of the current political structure in the GDR. The Soviets forced the fusion of the Communist and Social Democratic parties into the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland* (SED).⁶ This became the highly centralized communist party which is evident elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Other parties were allowed to exist, but they became part of the National Front and directly controlled by the SED. The fusion of the Communists and Social Democrats, as well as the legally sanctioned existence of other so-called "opposition" parties, occurred partly to give the illusion of greater participation and plurality in the face of the stark absence of legitimacy evident in the postwar Soviet Occupation Zone. The fact that the other parties remain in existence today exemplifies the continuing need for the regime to gain credibility as a governing structure.

⁵John M. Starrels and Anita M. Mallinckrodt, *Politics in the German Democratic Republic* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 27-31.

⁶For a detailed work on the coalition of the SPD and KPD as well as the creation of the National Front, see J.P. Nettle, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany- 1945-1950* (New York: Octagon Books, 1977).

This period was also the time of a declared "German road to socialism." Private property was largely abolished between 1946 and 1949, and major reforms in education and justice were undertaken to create a genuinely new society. The GDR was formally declared a state in 1949.

1950-1961- The second phase occurred during the 1950's. East Germany's political apparatus was preoccupied with suppressing both internal and external political opposition as illustrated in the June 1953 uprising in Berlin.

In general, this stage was characterized by the so-called class struggle within and by a continuous reorganization in almost all areas of the party, state, economy, and society. Not only did the SED leadership systematically try to place its loyal cadres in all these areas; it also methodically destroyed the remnants of private property and the older structures in commerce . . . the psychological achievements of the SED in these years were relatively limited.⁷

The decade of the 1950's was a period of massive emigration to the West and subsequent loss of skilled workers and intellectuals. During this time the party relied largely upon coercion to maintain power and public acquiescence -- coercion in the form of incarceration, forced labor, or control over job placement. As West Germany applied diplomatic and economic pressure throughout the world to isolate the GDR, the East German population began to maintain a wait-and-see attitude within this oppressive environment.⁸ However, this somewhat neutral stance was quickly altered when forced collectivization was introduced in 1961, reawakening the people to the reality of the socialist system in which they lived.

1962-Present- Thus, the third and present stage of development began. Until the middle 1960's the regime had not been capable of providing an appreciable semblance of social and economic stability to foster a better atmosphere of popular consensus on major societal issues. The primary factor which dramatically altered the position of the SED leadership was the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. As a result, the rapid flow of emigrants to the West was curtailed and the East German society was forced to

⁷Peter Ludz, *The GDR From the 60's to the 70's* (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1974), pp. 5-6.

⁸This period was one of the most threatening for the SED regime because of the massive emigration and economic/political isolation of the GDR. As long as the door to the West was at least partially open, the population was not forced to accept in their own minds the permanence of the situation. To them, reunification remained a real possibility for the near future.

accept the realities of the political, as well as economic, situation. Armed with this new sense of stability, the SED began to implement changes in its policies which reflected a growth in regime confidence and a sense of security. Persuasion began to slowly replace coercion as an instrument of control because as the human stream to the West was dammed, the most blatant evidence of the regime's illegitimacy and instability was eliminated. The regime could then turn to building a stronger economy and socialist society. Consequently, new flexibility appeared as seen in the introduction of the New Economic System (NES) in 1963.⁹

Today, the political structure itself is a close replica of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As in the USSR, the government consists of the Party and the State; the Party makes all major policy decisions and the State is tasked with carrying out these policies. The Politburo sits at the apex of the structure with twenty-five members, of which eight are alternates. These members represent the Party hierarchy, as well as government and mass organizations; they also are the real sources of political power in the GDR.

Below the Politburo, effective policymaking takes place in the Council of Ministers Presidium; the Council of Ministers itself; the Secretariat of the Central Committee; and the Central Committee (in order of importance). Many high Party officials also hold corresponding positions in the State hierarchy, thus reinforcing the pervasive influence of the SED.

More specifically, the functions of the Party can be divided into higher and lower strata. In the lower areas of Basic Party Organizations (BPO's), counties (*Bezirke*), and districts (*Kreis*) there are five functions:¹⁰

- 1) *Personnel*- the selecting and training of potential leaders and administrators for the Party.
- 2) *Socialization*- inculcating the basic values and knowledge which all citizens require to function in the new socialist system.
- 3) *Monitoring*- the constant overseeing of the performance of institutions.
- 4) *Coordination*- limiting the ubiquitous conflicts resulting from the vertical planning of the system.

⁹This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. To obtain an overall view of the NES see J. Wilczynski, *The Economics of Socialism* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1977); and Michael Keren, "The Rise and Fall of the New Economic System," in *The German Democratic Republic: A Developed Socialist Society*, ed. Lyman H. Legters (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 61-84.

¹⁰C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany: An Evaluation of a Socialist Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 47-51.

- 5) *Intervention*- fixing the malfunctions, whether they are political, administrative, or technical in nature.

The higher, or national, level of the Party carries out these five functions in addition to goal-setting. For the benefit of this paper, the most important functions of these five in building and maintaining regime legitimacy and stability are personnel selection and political socialization.

C. PARTY RECRUITMENT

The process of SED political recruitment is a vehicle for creating perceptions of popular participation and representation while simultaneously providing the necessary incentives to attract the needed talent into the governing structure. This process tends to coopt those who might under different circumstances become dissenters or at least non-actors in the creation of the "new socialist man". However, cooptation aside, the Party requires (and utilizes) only a few decisionmakers or power wielders.

If personnel selection is successful, then regime stability is maintained and a perception of legitimacy for the political system becomes more evident in the people. In addition, the acquisition of fresh personnel into the ruling party of the GDR assists in the maintenance of a stable and credible political structure. The Socialist Unity Party attempts to draw support from all facets of society in its recruiting of new members. This aids in creating popular support and, consequently, the recruiting process seems to be rather broad-based. The SED has a membership considerably larger than most communist countries in Eastern Europe as a percentage of its total population. In 1981 SED membership was 2,172,110 (including the candidate members) from a population of approximately 16.5 million.¹¹ This large SED structure reflects the importance placed on Party membership by the people because all important avenues of education and work are opened by way of the Party. However, the mass membership of the East German Party is not a catch-all for opportunists or mediocre talent. It is in the SED's best interest to recruit from society those who are most skilled and educated in order to ensure that qualified political and administrative personnel will be available to fill the vacancies which will occur: after all, the more efficient the regime can become in fulfilling its functions, the more it appears legitimate and remains stable.

¹¹Ibid., p. 42.

The young person who seems promising to the Party is usually identified by the basic party organization (BPO). More than 50 percent of SED recruits have graduated from an institution of higher learning or technical college.¹² These young people are selected on the basis of academic achievement, proven community service, an untainted political past, and at least partial or temporary membership in the communist youth organization. Often, written recommendations from SED officials are required. This type of SED candidate resembles those in the United States who may be applying for appointments to well-known graduate schools. Other avenues into the SED are open to the upper ranks of the youth organization, the military, and industrial/labor unions. After selection, there is a mandatory one year probation period or candidacy before final acceptance is granted. These rather stringent requirements illustrate that there are many East Germans willing to join the Social Unity Party; a fact which is important because it places the East German communist membership in a more prestigious position than in other communist parties in Eastern Europe.

Although the class structure of the society is maintained in proportion, membership seems to be moving towards an elite party or pseudo-aristocracy.¹³ One reason for this, besides the selection process discussed above, is the predominance of educated, technical recruits. This creates on the one hand an acceptance of a "meritocratic" system which could attract younger, more talented individuals, while on the other hand, it damages the Marxist concept of the classless society, at least in the eyes of the average East German. Hence the recruiting process encourages regime — *stability* by fostering a supply of talented people, but because of the ideology involved, *legitimacy* of the system may suffer in the long run. This is one of those rare times where the two aspects of legitimacy and stability may not be mutually helpful. Nonetheless, the process of selection discussed above has helped to create a new and influential element of leadership within the ruling structure in East Germany.

One in six people over the age of eighteen belongs to the Party. However, the average SED member wields very little power and possesses little or no voice in policymaking. They do provide the illusion of popular participation and serve as a link

¹²Eugene K. Keefe, *East Germany: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1982), p. 81.

¹³Although the percentage of workers in the party had risen from 48.1% in 1947 to 56.1% in 1976, the percentage of intellectuals had grown from 8.7% in 1961 to 20% in 1976 (a greater rate of growth in less than half the time). See Paul S. Shoup, *The East European and Soviet Data Handbook- Political, Social, and Developmental Indicators: 1945-1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), Table B-5.

to the masses; however, it is the party cadres who are the sources of real political power. These party members in particular are the ones who assure that the system performs as it should and are responsible for carrying out those functions of the Party discussed previously. Although total membership is supposed to reflect the rough proportions of class structure (namely the preponderance of working class members), the cadre membership is becoming more and more educated and technical. The greater proportion of new party members with advanced formal education, technical expertise, and experience in engineering, science, economics, and mathematics reflects the new social stratum in the GDR called the "technical intelligensia." In Thomas Baylis' words:

The technical intelligensia in the German Democratic Republic (DDR) is an example of an infrequent but fascinating social phenomenon: a stratum consciously created by a political regime as an instrument for furthering its goals for remaking society.¹⁴

The creation of a "technocracy" of highly rewarded and apparently status-conscious people was indeed a process carried out by the East German political leaders with "malice of forethought." They realized that Marx and Lenin provided a set of codes to be followed generally, but that the realities and logic of a modern and complex industrial society demanded technical expertise. This new technocratic stratum was a direct result of the need to rebuild the East German economy and infrastructure following World War II. In addition, the large-scale emigration of the 1940's and 1950's produced a severe shortage of trained and experienced personnel. Therefore, the creation of the technical intelligensia was a necessity for obtaining the material goals of the Party, which in turn served to build popular confidence in the government. In part, the New Economic System was a result of this new entity gaining inroads into the governing apparatus. Their ability to go around the system, their aura of flexibility, and their recognition of the need for economic pragmatism in the GDR have proven an attraction for popular support:

In the early postwar days the SED had relied for moral authority on its claim to be heir to German revolutionary traditions and on its sacrifices under Hitler. But

¹⁴Thomas A. Baylis, *The Technical Intelligensia and the East German Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. ix.

for large sections of the population, who were still infected with nationalism, the SED's attempts at self-legitimation were irrelevant or even counter-productive. . . . With the NES and the appointment of economic experts the SED could claim the legitimacy which comes from successful government performance especially in the economy. The use of experts symbolized the shift in the SED's ideology and propaganda towards modernization and rationalization. It was also a way of integrating the new professional elites into the government.

However, does this new intelligensia possess real political power? Thomas Baylis suggests:

While the technocratic phenomenon in itself suggests no unambiguous directions for policy, it imposes limitations on the means by which specialists may achieve political influence. The hostility of the (ideal) technocrat to politics would appear in principle to be seriously disabling. Unwilling to bend to the customary tactics of political struggle (and here it does not matter whether the setting is democratic or authoritarian), he all but deprives himself of the possibility of directly achieving power.¹⁶ His only plausible route to influence becomes that of cooptation from above.

Therefore, the technical elite in the GDR wield political power only in that they can influence the execution of policy. Through cooptation, the "technical intelligensia" are utilized by the regime and maintained within its control.

It is then evident that recruitment into the party, government, and administrative structures is carried out in a well-planned method with the needs of the socialist polity always in mind. The cooptation and utilization of the more talented personnel in society contributes to less dissent, better results, and party prestige. As these technocrats rise in the political hierarchy, they will come to constitute greater proportions of the one percent of the population who belong to the political elite.

D. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

There have been fundamental societal changes in the GDR since World War II. To bring about a more integrated and, consequently, more acquiescent society, the regime has focused its attention on eliminating the "bourgeois" nature within the GDR. This socialization process has been carried out through youth policy (education and organizations), propaganda, emphasis on collectivism, and officially sanctioned nationalism (national identity). All of these are evident in Walter Ulbricht's 1958 "ten commandments of socialist morality":

¹⁵Jonathon Steele, *Inside East Germany*, p. 123.

¹⁶Thomas Baylis, *The Technical Intelligensia*, pp. 270-271.

- 1) Thou shalt honor the international solidarity of the working class and the proletariat and strive for friendship and alliance between all socialist countries.
- 2) Thou shalt love thy fatherland and always be prepared to defend the Workers and Peasants' State with all thy strength.
- 3) Thou shalt help to eliminate exploitation of man by man.
- 4) Thou shalt strive to perform good socialism, for it leads to a better life for all members of the working class.
- 5) Thou shalt act in a spirit of comradely cooperation and mutual help in the construction of socialism and respect the collective and take heart its criticism.
- 6) Thou shalt protect and help to multiply the people's property.
- 7) Thou shalt strive to improve thy productivity, to be thrifty and frugal and to strengthen socialist discipline of labor.
- 8) Thou shalt raise thy children in the spirit of socialism and peace and help them to become well-educated, healthy and strong persons in body and mind.
- 9) Thou shalt live cleanly and decently and respect thy family.
- 10) Thou shalt practice and observe solidarity with those peoples of the world fighting for their freedom and struggling to defend their national independence.¹⁷

1. Youth Policies

All societies are concerned that their youth should inherit and promulgate the collective norms and values of their society from one generation to another. This is no different in the GDR; the only change is the creation by the SED of new socialist values (i.e., collectivism, international proletarianism, and working for the good of socialism and not the individual) to substitute for the old ones (i.e., laboring for oneself and family, belief in individual freedoms and "classic" democracy, and support for individual freedom). Indeed, the concern in a revolutionary communist society for the transformation of cultural values, orientations, and ethics to fit socialist criteria is directly related to the quest for stability and legitimacy by the Party. Although this metamorphosis may lead to a temporary loss of stability (as in Stalin's Purges), the final goal, if attained, will be increased systemic stability.

The impetus for change and continuity of the new system rests on the shoulders of the youth. The role of the younger people in the GDR, as in other communist societies, is often explained or justified in terms of ideology: "In particular, this ideological significance demands on the part of youth the development of certain personal characteristics which are deemed vital if youth are to fulfill their present and

¹⁷The Soviet Union adopted a close copy of this in 1961. John Dornberg, *The Other Germany* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 228-229.

future responsibilities."¹⁸ These responsibilities include the cultivation of the "socialist personality", an internationalist attitude, a socialist work ethic, proper behavior, relevant knowledge, and love for the fatherland.

Political socialization begins in early childhood in East Germany and is difficult to carry out in the family environment:

A major socialization impact usually occurs in the early years of life within the family context. Children acquire politically relevant values by generalizing from their experience in family authority relations and in imitating the behavior and attitudes of their parents toward the wider world. Obviously, parental participation in this process is, for the most part, unconscious or latent. In a society whose leaders are intent on promoting social change, socialization in the family—whether conscious or unconscious—can be a serious obstacle, especially in those cases¹⁹ where a modernizing political regime confronts a very traditional population.

As a result, socialist values are stressed throughout the educational program; all academic instruction, especially science and mathematics, is heavily laced with ideology. Curriculum content is monitored by the government to ensure proper philosophical and ideological values and orientation. Therefore, the citizens' first encounter with the State and its quest for stability and legitimacy begins in the educational institutions and remains with them throughout their scholastic years under the total control of the governing structure.

The educational system begins with preschool kindergarten for ages three to six. The standard ten-year polytechnical education which follows is compulsory for everyone between the ages of six and sixteen. Higher education then splits into two different directions: general education as preparation for university training or vocational training. For the duration of the educational experience, socialization is intense and often more time-consuming in certain classes than is academic work.

More specifically, the first of three stages is the primary stage (grades one through four), which introduces the young children to the fundamentals of good citizenship in the socialist sense, in addition to the general education requirements of mathematics, literature, etc. The second stage takes place in grades four to six where the student is given a more intensive political and ideological foundation. This serves to assist the student in "correctly" assessing his or her role and position in the socialist

¹⁸Stephen R. Bowers, "Youth Policies in the GDR", *Problems of Communism* (March-April 1978), p. 78.

¹⁹C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany*, p. 126.

state as well as the external world. The connection between education and work is emphasized along with the importance of a "socialist attitude" towards labor. The final stage incorporates the last four grades of the general polytechnical schooling. Besides weekly hands-on training in industrial factories and workplaces, and continued political training, science and mathematics are gradually given a prominent role in the curriculum. This is a result of the regime's need for technically-oriented individuals as discussed earlier.²⁰

2. Propaganda

Besides childhood education, another prominent form of socialization takes advantage of the pervasiveness of newspaper readers and owners of televisions and radios in East Germany. This creates a special niche for the public media and propagandists. Peter Grothe considers:

... the purpose of Communist propaganda in East Germany, as, indeed, in every Communist country, is clear: to change the very consciousness of man. The purpose is to atomize the individual thinking of 17,000,000 East Germans and to grind them into one species- homo sovieticus- "The New Man". "The New Man" will parrot slogans when they should be parroted; he will do what should be done; he will say what should be said; he will think what should be thought; and he will feel what should be felt.²¹

What better way to ensure a stable political atmosphere than to control the informational inputs (in order to manipulate the output) of a people's thoughts?

There are thirty-eight daily newspapers, five hundred monthly magazines and weekly papers, two color television stations, and numerous radio stations in the GDR.²² Therefore, the SED possesses multiple outlets for political propaganda and agitation in order to inculcate socialist ideas and even simple semantics into the population. For instance, even avowed enemies of the regime in the GDR have easily fallen into the routine of using some typical East German words such as *sozialistisches Lager* (the socialist camp of the communist states) or other socialist words such as "bourgeois" or "imperialism." The population repeatedly hears and remembers these semantics of the "language" of socialism.

²⁰For an excellent overview of the relationship between education and socialization, as well as political recruitment, see Thomas A. Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite*.

²¹Peter Grothe, *To Win the Minds of Men: The Story of the Communist Propaganda in East Germany* (Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1958), p. 38.

²²C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany*, pp. 127-128.

The offices which control propaganda and agitation belong to the SED organizational structure rather than the state bureaucracy.²³ This illustrates the importance the SED places on having the media controlled by the Party and not the State. Although this internal control of GDR media is virtually universal, external programming from the Federal Republic of Germany is widely received throughout the country as what GDR experts in 1984 described as "long term poison in small doses" and "ideological sabotage against true socialism in the GDR."²⁴ However, it would be almost impossible for the average citizen not to be affected in some way by the communist controlled information around him. Therefore, propaganda does serve to color his attitudes and values in a useful way (from the perspective of the regime). In this regard, the propaganda organs of the SED attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Given the amount of rhetoric, deception, falsification, and non-reporting in the official SED controlled media, even partial absorption could create a population which is skeptical of Western media and information.

The emphasis placed upon Agitprop in the GDR is evidenced in the large numbers of personnel involved in ideological work. The elite structures within the Agitprop apparatus demonstrate the importance of propaganda in legitimizing SED rule. Thomas Baylis has identified four groups of what he terms as "ideological elites:"²⁵

- 1) Ideological administrators are the first group, and includes those individuals who head Agitprop within the Party apparatus. For example, the Central Committee Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda, Joachim Herrmann, would be considered a member of this group. In addition, head administrators in the lower Agitprop organizations belong to this category.
- 2) Education and Culture Officials make up the second group. Party functionaries such as the Secretary of the Central Committee for Science and Culture hold important positions in ideological responsibilities.
- 3) Teachers, scholars, administrators, and political officers who interpret and are involved in the study or teaching of socialist thought are the third group. Also in this category are persons involved in related fields such as philosophy, social sciences, economics, and law. They are important (in Agitprop) because of their influence on the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to their students and

²³The importance of the agitation and propaganda apparatuses (Agitprop) was expanded with the accession to power of Honecker in 1971 as evidenced by the promotions of Werner Krolkowski and Werner Lamberz to the Politburo; both were formerly involved in the agitprop apparatus. See Eugene Keefe, ed., *East Germany*, p. 182.

²⁴*Hamburg DPA*, 31 August 1984, in *FBIS* (Eastern Europe), 5 September 1984, p. E 2.

²⁵See Thomas Baylis, "Agitprop as a Vocation: The East German Ideological Elite," *Polity* (Fall 1985).

colleagues. For example, heads of the ideological training academies such as the "Karl Marx" Academy are included in this group.

- 4) Lastly, the media specialists who are responsible for disseminating information to the public constitute the fourth group. Editors, publishers, newscasters, and film producers who are connected to (and controlled by) the SED are members of this group.

According to Baylis, the ideological elite in the GDR may enjoy more upward mobility in their careers than do their counterparts in the Soviet Union. He identifies the most important reason as:

... undoubtedly the DDR leadership's awareness of being on the "ideological front lines" of the Cold War. Its highly educated citizenry is confronted with the blandishments of West German television and an unceasing flow of telephone calls and visits from German-speaking carriers of Bourgeois ideas and values

The threat to popular "consciousness" they pose gives new urgency to the regime's continuing preoccupation with fortifying its ideological defenses Ideology, in other words, is intimately linked with the question of legitimacy in the eyes of the DDR's leaders, including those who themselves have little interest in the niceties of formal doctrine the DDR's ideological specialists seek to legitimize the regime not only in the eyes of the East German citizenry, but of the Soviet Union and, perhaps, even the DDR leaders themselves.²⁶

Agitation and propaganda is thus a pivotal aspect of SED attempts at domestic legitimacy.

3. Collectivism

Another important means of political socialization consciously used by the leaders in the GDR is the constant emphasis on collectivism or corporatism. The more organic and interdependent the culture can be made, the less chance for independent and hence dissenting thought. The importance of the goals of the new socialist system in East Germany have been molded into a joint undertaking for its people by the SED with the hope of attaining a collective consciousness as a means for maintaining stability.

During the first decade and a half after World War II, the communist rule in East Germany concentrated on elimination of the hostile elements of society -- that is, hostile to the regime and socialism. This included Nazis, small and large entrepreneurs, "real" Social Democrats, and later, labor unions and would-be emigrants. This illustrated the complete lack of unity in the nation, especially after the June 1953 uprising (Chapter 3 discusses this in more detail). The signal event of the construction of the Berlin Wall marked a turning point in the ability of the regime physically to

²⁶Ibid., pp. 45-46.

compel its population into a position of more control. The 1963 Party Program outlined the prediction that a "comprehensive building of socialism" would result from the greater unity of the people."²⁷ Therefore, the task taken on by the SED was to bring together the diverse interests and attitudes of the different segments within the society in a unity of mind and effort. This was used to elucidate the spirit of corporatism and collectivism which has been a continuous theme throughout the last twenty-five years and used by Party theorists to weld all citizens into a collective social organism.

The Party considers itself the vanguard of a society consisting of working people by working people for working people. However, in order for the society to work for the benefit of the existing political structure, the individual must be taken out of the picture and replaced by the collective man. The "I" must be changed to a collective "we." Because collectivism relates to the entire lifestyle of individuals, the SED attempts to create "public virtues" which have proven somewhat successful in bringing a corporate nature into the society.²⁸ A social ethic of joint cooperation among individuals has been created and permeates all aspects of East German life. Much of this socialization process is a result of the introduction of educational theories into the Soviet Occupation Zone by the Soviet Union. In the GDR this concept of collectivism is called *Bildung und Erziehung* and has been applied to every form of social interaction and existence. The Party expects that this entire process will produce a consensus of joint sacrifice and contribution for the good of the whole at the expense of the individual.

There are factory collectives, agricultural collectives, literary collectives, and even sports collectives to help in bringing about a corporate consciousness in the citizenry. These are not only collective in organization, but also operation; for, although (in communism) collectivism is first and foremost economic in character, the socialization aspects of collectivism are possibly just as important in the East German case. Mass organizations are also an integral part of this process. These include the Free German Trade Union with approximately 96 percent of all workers.²⁹ There are

²⁷This was adopted at the Sixth SED Congress of January 1963, one of many important political statements which followed in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall.

²⁸See Starrels and Mallinckrodt, *Politics in the GDR*, p. 36.

²⁹Eugene Keefe, ed., *East Germany*, p. 92.

also organizations for youth (Free German Youth) and for women (Democratic Women's League).

Continued militarization of East German society is also motivated by the SED's desire to collectivize further the populace. This militarization takes the forms of parades, massive troop movements, war toys in kindergartens, hand-grenade practice for youngsters, a compulsory and almost universal draft, civil defense exercises, and the official praising of military virtues. In addition, there are approximately 167,000 East German and 420,000 Soviet troops stationed throughout the GDR. Added to this the security police, border units, and militia units, the total number of men under arms in East Germany well exceeds 1,200,000, creating the most dense concentration of military troops in the world.³⁰ This amounts to approximately 11 soldiers per square kilometer.³¹

The military itself serves a socialization function:

On the internal scene, it is important as a vehicle for socializing the country's youth. It teaches discipline, works actively to counter Western ideas and influence, and, to the degree possible, inculcates in₃₂ the minds of its recruits acceptance of (if not enthusiastic loyalty to) the GDR.

Throughout 1985, the SED increased militarization of East German society as seen in the importance placed on the 5th military sports games of the paramilitary youth organization, The Society for Sports and Technology, in July. The games, called *Wehrspartakiade*, were a major event with 8,100 contestants from over 200,000 would-be participants.³³ In addition, career and educational opportunities were increasingly linked to military participation and school curricula reflected increased militarization.³⁴

³⁰"East Germany is Starting to Throw Its Weight Around," *The New York Times*, 3 June 1984, p. E 3.

³¹Norman M. Naimark, "Is It True What They're Saying About East Germany?" *Orbis* 23 (Fall 1979), p. 569.

³²Dale R. Herspring, "GDR Naval Buildup," *Problems of Communism* (January-February 1984), p. 54.

³³Matthew Boyse, "Increased Militarization of East German Society," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Background Report/86, 23 August 1985), p. 1.

³⁴Even during the higher education years, students must participate in pre-military practice in special camps. Refusal means that any pursuit of academic qualifications other than ecclesiastical is not allowed; see Wolfgang Mleczkowski, "In Search of the Forbidden Nation: Opposition by the Young Generation in the GDR," *Government and Opposition* 18 (Spring 1983), p. 189.

Militarization in East Germany will continue to serve important functions in the socialization process. Given the existence of the Soviet and East German military apparatuses, the geographic position of the GDR, and past military traditions of the Prussian people, militarization can, and does, play important roles in fostering a collective spirit (and obedience) within the populace.

4. National Identity

The last major category used to attain political socialization goals is that of nationalism and national identity. From the beginning, the ruling polity has recognized the importance of patriotism and national identification within the GDR. The common cultural, familial, and linguistic ties between East and West Germany have proven to be some of the largest obstacles in the establishment of political and national legitimacy for East Germany. The creation of a German Democratic consciousness has become an imperative goal of the Ulbricht and Honecker regimes. Angela Stent discusses this problem:

The most intractable problem facing the GDR leadership since 1949 has been the inability to develop a separate *socialist* German national identity. This is probably true for most East European nations, but the difference is that there is another German state with a different sociopolitical system acting as a strong magnet for the East German population and as an additional source of instability for Honecker's government.³⁵

There are at least five ways the leaders of the GDR have attempted to create a separate national identity and thus enhance legitimacy in East Germany:

- 1) The reinterpretation of German history by official historians has tried to relate German and specifically, Prussian experiences with the present socialist and authoritarian society.
- 2) Through intense socialization, the Party has encouraged the development of a new value system which is very different from that existing in West Germany.
- 3) Linguistic differences have been encouraged to develop in East German society.
- 4) The constant portrayal of the GDR as the "guarantor of peace" in Europe as opposed to the so-called warmongers in the FRG serves to reinforce the idea that the GDR is the legal and moral heir to the German nation.
- 5) The emphasis on the new worldwide recognition of the regime contributes to a sense of perceived sovereignty by the GDR's citizens.

³⁵Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, ed. S.M. Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 51.

German History- History gives the East German propagandists many "progressive" personalities to be held up in high esteem for their contributions to the socialist legacy. Socialists Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Karl Liebknecht are praised as great contributors to the evolution of the SED and East Germany. Great military or artistic figures are honored as belonging to the communist historical progress of ideas, and if they happen to be Prussian, that is even better. Some of these include Clausewitz, Blucher, J.S. Bach, and Goethe. In a speech in October 1985, SED Politburo member Kurt Hager stated:

That which had been the goal of the struggle of the working people for centuries, that which had been proclaimed by Marx and Engels, that for which August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Ernst Thaelmann, and Wilhelm Pieck had led the party of the workers class into struggle, and that for which tens of thousands of Communists, social democrats, and other brave fighters had sacrificed their lives against fascism came true: a state of peace and human dignity was established.³⁶

This competition for the German *Kulturnation* was also evident in 1983 during the East German celebration of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. The celebration was much larger than the ceremonies on the 100th anniversary of Karl Marx's death -- all this from an officially atheistic government. This line of thought seeks to emphasize that the GDR is a positive and natural continuation of Germany's past while the FRG is only a reactionary power which has remained into obsolescence.

Previously censured political and literary figures have also been praised through rehabilitation or publication of their once forbidden works. One example of this was the republishing of the Stalinist Ernst Bloch's *Freiheit und Ordnung* (Freedom and Order) in July 1985. Why the revival of this revisionist?

... it must be seen against the background of a general reorientation of the SED's attitude toward German history and culture. Bloch is only the most recent in an increasingly long list of historical figures chosen for rehabilitation in the name of what the party refers to as the "socialist understanding of (national) heritage." The historical revisionism, designed to create a new national history to strengthen the foundations of the SED's rule, is based on the understanding that "socialism is the legitimate heir to everything revolutionary, progressive, and humanistic in all of German history."³⁷

³⁶NEPSZBADSAG, Budapest, 6 October 1984, p. 5.

³⁷B.V. Flow, "The Revival of Ernst Bloch-- A Pandora's Box For the GDR?" *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Background Report/80, 16 August 1985), p. 3.

Socialization- The development of the socialist personality and its logical connection with the communist state also assists in producing a unique quality of national identity. The collective nature of sacrifice and authoritarianism which is inherent in Marxism/Leninism has cultural roots in the Prussian nation as well. The East German policymakers have thus been able to capitalize on traditional Prussian values such as self-sacrifice, discipline, hard work, and the historical preference for limited subjection to authority over personal freedom. This has been referred to by several experts as "Red Prussianism" -- the tradition among Germans (especially Prussians) to obey and work no matter what. These values have been utilized to set the East Germans apart from the "fun loving and carefree Bavarians" in the West.

Language- Differences in speech between East and West Germany are officially encouraged by the SED, and these linguistic differences can already be distinguished from the German spoken in the FRG. Many of the changes are a result of the infusion of technical, ideological, and official jargon into society. Although language is slow to change, these linguistic differences, if allowed to continue, can only assist the cultural separation of the GDR from the FRG.

"Guarantor of Peace"- The emphasis on the role of the GDR as the greatest European contributor to the postwar peace attempts to place East Germany in a morally superior light when compared to the FRG. This serves to provide a foundation for the East German nation; a strategy which attempts to justify that all things which are morally good exist in the GDR while all things morally bad are reflective of West Germany. National identity is thus enhanced by the resultant national pride which, in turn, is created by emphasizing the beauty of living in such a righteous and morally correct society; a society which is striving for the building of a peaceful world "in spite of West German revanchism."

Worldwide Recognition- The widespread international recognition of the GDR when it became a member of the United Nations in 1973 gave a great boost to its national identity. Today, whenever a visit by East German officials to other countries takes place, especially by Erich Honecker, there is a greater coverage given to the event than would be expected from other countries of similar international standing. In writing of the Honecker visit to Greece in October 1985, Ronald Asmus relates:

In many ways more interesting, however, was the political rhetoric that surrounded the visit and the apparent convergence of views between the two states on several key arms control issues One is tempted to view the media hype associated with Honecker's new Western forays as a new type of personality cult in the GDR, the cult of the new international traveler in a country where Western travel remains the privilege of a very chosen few.³⁸

This personality cult lends itself to the illusion of international equality with other national leaders and diplomatic missions, consequently enhancing national prestige.

Although the GDR leadership has attempted through these means to create a separate national identity, its inability to do so remains quite evident. The average East German does not accept the official line. A survey taken informally by the SED recently revealed that 75 percent of young people between the ages of 16 and 25 consider themselves German before they do East German.³⁹

E. SOCIAL POLICY

Traditionally, one of the most effective ways of building popular support for the ruling political entity has been to deliver to the population those things it needs and desires. This is no different in the GDR. With the greatest standard of living in the Communist world, it is very evident that the SED strives, quite literally, to deliver the goods. During the last twenty-five years the East German government has attempted to gain the support and loyalty of its citizens by providing for their health and welfare. In November 1985 Erich Honecker reiterated the importance of this implement:

For the past 1 and 1/2 decades we have been resolutely adhering to a policy of increasing the material and cultural standards of our people on the basis of accelerating the development of production, scientific-technological progress, and growth in labor productivity. This policy of the unity of economic and social policy benefits all elements of society. It will continue to determine the goal and direction of our action in the future.⁴⁰

Social policy in the GDR serves two functions for the Socialist Unity Party:

. . . . On the one hand, its function is the same as it is normally in Western capitalist societies, namely, to compensate, after they have occurred, for socially

³⁸Ronald Asmus, "Honecker in Greece," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Background Report 126, 15 November 1985), pp. 2-3.

³⁹Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the GDR," p. 51.

⁴⁰See "Honecker Presents Politburo Report to SED CC," *ADN International*, 22 November 1984, in *FBIS* (Eastern Europe), 27 November 1984, p. E 1.

unsatisfactory results arising out of unequal opportunities and inequitable distribution procedures in the production process, and to assure certain disadvantaged groups (invalids, the elderly, etc.) a "suitable living standard in line with existing possibilities." On the other hand, the party considers social policy as a potential new instrument for influencing societal development".

A "social fund," consisting of contributions from government, production enterprises, and other organizations, is the foundation for social policy in the GDR. Monies and aid from this welfare pool are responsible for maintaining personal income; unemployment compensation; family allowances and dependent support; health care; education and training; housing subsidies and construction; and recreational and cultural facilities. These subsidies and payments assist in satisfying physical and mental needs and, in turn, provide popular support for the government responsible for them.⁴²

The importance of continued increases in material benefits and levels of personal consumption to the SED is reflected in its economic policies (see Chapter 3). Price stabilization and support policies provide greater ease in purchasing the essential goods and services of everyday life, as well as those nonessential goods which are both popular and socially acceptable. In fact, price subsidies represent the greatest single component of the entire social fund.⁴³ Price subsidies are estimated to go up by 13% in 1986 to OM (East German Mark) 46,200,000; almost 20% of the entire state budget.⁴⁴

The GDR attempted throughout the 1970's to increase the supply and variety of consumer durables and luxury items while simultaneously holding down the prices of staples, essential commodities, and basic services. However, because of the large Western loans incurred in the 1970's and the subsequent payment requirements on these, luxury items became scarcer, prices rose, and staple consumer goods were in shorter supply by the early 1980's.⁴⁵ Shortages and higher prices for raw materials and

⁴¹Hartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (March-April 1978), p. 25.

⁴²The State provides 75% of social fund expenditures with the remaining 25% derived from production enterprises, social organizations, churches, and other charities. In addition, this fund as a share of personal income across the board is slated to grow as the society approaches the transition into the "early phases of communism," see C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany*, p. 101.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴⁴See B.V. Flow, "5 More Years of 'Comprehensive Intensification' for the GDR's Economy," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAID Background Report 6, 24 January 1986), p. 3.

⁴⁵Ronald Asmus, "The Policy of Damage Limitation," in *Soviet East European*

energy have also contributed to the slow-down in consumer gains. Although 1984 and 1985 were extremely good years for the economy, the GDR leadership today has found it more difficult to continue the past growth in the standard of living (which the people have grown to expect). This becomes more important when Western media access shows the average East German consumer that he is beginning to lag even further behind his West German counterpart.

However, the "cradle to grave" welfare state evident in the GDR has provided some support for the regime. As the economic wealth of East Germany has grown, so has the scope and size of the welfare inputs throughout the system. The popular well-being of the people and its continued emphasis, as reflected in official policy, will remain a major implement in the maintenance of popular acceptance, or at least tolerance, of the regime into the near future. One East German citizen stated in January 1986 that she would not consider escaping to the West as her relatives had in the past because East Germany was her home and not that dissatisfying; her husband stated: "It's our system and we live in it. We must *live* in it."⁴⁶

F. SUMMARY

The domestic policies outlined here contribute to an overall campaign to attain greater stability and legitimacy from the East German citizen. Although the political culture and organization were forced upon the GDR, they are utilized to provide a structural basis for rule along "scientific" and historical lines of thought. Cooptation of those citizens most capable and talented legitimizes SED rule by simultaneously absorbing possible sources of dissent, improving actual capabilities and results with more competent membership, and upgrading the popular perception of the caliber of the Party member. Through political socialization, the SED attempts to create a new socialist East German as compared with the capitalist German past -- socialization carried out through childhood indoctrination, propaganda, and an increased emphasis on the East German national identity. Finally, the maintenance and improvement of the day to day lives of the average citizens through social policies in health, housing, consumer goods, etc. are sought to coax some level of acceptance from the East German population.

Survey, 1983-1984, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 244.

⁴⁶"East German Couple Copes With Life Despite Limitations," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 9 January 1986, pp. 25-27.

The importance of the domestic sphere of policymaking carries over to international relations, mainly in the form of economics. The next section addresses the importance of economics in the attainment of legitimacy and stability in both the domestic and international arenas.

III. LEGITIMATION THROUGH ECONOMICS

... economic strength is the linchpin of all promised political and social change. In addition, economic performance provides the single and most visible standard by which people judge the SED's claim to rule.⁴⁷

A. INTRODUCTION

As in most communist regimes and Eastern bloc countries, the GDR must show continued socio-economic progress to gain popular support. SED leadership has concentrated on maintaining an acceptable rise in the East German standard of living, especially after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961; the regime could then turn from suppressing the mass exodus of East Germans to the West and concentrate upon seriously building the economic and administrative infrastructure needed to modernize the country, and consequently, build legitimacy and stability for the regime. In other words, the wall allowed the regime to turn to the courting of popular support over popular suppression. In discussing economics in the GDR, Starrells and Mallinckrodt note:

Strictly speaking, the GDR's economic situation is inseparable from political considerations. If foreign-policy making involves decision-making in coordinative planning, and consultative activities, there is little argument that East Germany's external policies are strongly reflected in socio-economic issues. Beginning with 1945, with the onset of crippling reparations and dismantling schedules, and ending with the use of economic reforms as a means of engendering political legitimacy (and hence stability), the GDR's foreign policy identity has been linked with socio-economic variables.⁴⁸

Today, the GDR is among the most industrialized countries of the world, even when viewed in Western terms of economic strength. Its citizens enjoy a very high standard of living due in part to the continuing effort of SED policies. The importance of the consumer's satisfaction in the GDR was underscored by the Ninth SED Congress in 1976 where "enhancement of the material and cultural standard of living of

⁴⁷C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany: An Evaluation of Socialist Democracy* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), pp 68-69.

⁴⁸John M. Starrells and Anita M. Mallinckrodt, "East German Foreign Policy", in *The Foreign Policies of Eastern Europe* (Leyden, Netherlands: A.W. Sijthof Publishing Company, 1978), p. 88.

the people" was identified as its main task. Thus economics exists as an important source of legitimacy for the SED, and the regime has attempted to use it fully as a valuable tool in overcoming its legitimacy and stability problems. To better understand the development of economics as a legitimizer, it is necessary to briefly trace the history of the East German economy.

B. THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY: 1945-1975

The economic system inherited by what was to become the German Democratic Republic was a result of both World War II and the postwar Soviet occupation. The previous Nazi dependence upon a war-supporting economy led to a rapid breakdown of the intricate German economic system during the postwar Soviet occupation of the Eastern zones. The subsequent stripping of industrial equipment and labor by the Soviets only added to the dire situation in these postwar years. Goods distribution problems, wrecked transport systems, restricted movement due to the zonal division of Germany, and splintered economic infrastructure combined to force a regression to a simplified economic system -- barter. This situation spawned serious food shortages, loss of faith in currency, subsequent low productivity, and rampant inflation. The following years witnessed Soviet reparation programs which emasculated the country. As early as September 1945, the Soviets had begun transforming their zone into a communist economic entity. That year witnessed the break up of all large agricultural estates and their nationalization. Farms over 100 hectares were divided up among smaller farmers. In July 1946, all large industrial concerns were transferred to state ownership destroying any potential reemergence of the upper and big business classes. This in turn aided in the emergence of more centralized control of all economic matters by the central government which continues today as the Centrally Planned Economy (CPE).

Woefully deprived of natural resources and possessing no official currency, the East German zone was forced to struggle under the Soviet Military Administration's (SMAD's) total control. In 1945 the economic differences between the two Germanies were extreme. For example, the only production which surpassed that of the Western zones was potash production capacity which stood at approximately 30% of the rest of Germany.⁴⁹ Almost all other major resources and production were far greater in West

⁴⁹Karel Holbik and Henry Myers, *Postwar Trade in Divided Germany* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 13.

Germany (a significant fact since West Germany was also a devastated country). Thirty percent of the population, thirty percent of the arable land, twenty-nine percent of all forest land, only 4.6 percent of coal production, and six percent of the entire steel capacity of prewar Germany indicated that the Eastern zones were impoverished regions with which to attempt to create a new and viable socialist nation.⁵⁰ In addition, labor shortages created a severe problem which would continue to haunt the GDR. The economic legacy through the 1950's was thus one of shortages -- shortages of energy, natural resources, capital, and qualified labor. Four areas of concern became important for the SED to confront during this time:

- 1) The need to reorganize the means of redistribution and transport of goods and materials on a national basis.
- 2) The requirement to reopen contact with the rest of the world to obtain the needed imports of raw materials, energy, and food (a quest which has still not been fully satisfied).
- 3) The need to take action to stockpile remaining industrial material and consumer goods to aid in maintaining stability for the years of shortage and hardship during the reconstruction period. This was especially so since the East Germans were not allowed by the Soviets to receive Western aid such as the Marshall Plan.
- 4) An immediate solution to the growing emigration of dissatisfied East Germans which continued to drain the ranks of labor throughout the decade of the 1950's.

To counter these problems, national economic planning was geared to the Soviet Gosplan (molded to serve Soviet economic demands and needs). As in all centrally planned economies based on this Soviet model, the leadership set the priorities and goals for the differing sectors of the economy such as consumer goods, heavy industry, and agriculture. This was described in a socialist textbook as:

... the system of managing economic processes involving production, distribution, investment, and consumption. Its essence consists in determining economic targets and methods for their implementation, in particular the allocation of the means of production and of labour to different uses. As such, planning is an instrument of economic strategy to achieve the optimum growth of national income or the maximum satisfaction of social needs.⁵¹

Beginning with the first *East German* economic plan in 1949, the domestic policies were aimed increasingly at state ownership and control of all sectors of production. From this time on state enterprises were given priority for investment.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 13

⁵¹J. Wilczynski, *The Economics of Socialism* (London: George Allin and Unwin Ltd., 1977), p. 33.

delivery of raw materials, labor, and taxation policies. This first economic plan was a very short one, 1949-1950. As in other communist countries, it concentrated on industrial growth: mining, electricity production, engineering, metallurgical, chemical, and building industries.

The next five-year plan was introduced in 1951. By 1955 all of the goals of this plan had been met which more than doubled prewar output of the gross industrial product. During this period the SED regime first experienced the costs of denying citizens consumer goods and services due to the heavy industrialization of the economy as illustrated in the 1953 worker revolt in East Berlin.⁵² Consequently, the next five-year plan provided for a 40% increase in consumer goods production -- the beginning of the real emphasis on economics as a tool to gain popular support (and thus, legitimacy) for the Marxist/Leninist government in East Germany. Speaking of this period, Jonathon Steele writes:

The GDR's identity was already conditioned by the constant sense of competition with the West. Economic results and 'consumer' values were seen as the criterion for judging the society's success or failure.⁵³

East German speakers at the Socialist Unity Party Congresses even predicted overtaking West Germany's economy. They based their predictions on the expanding rate of economic growth.⁵⁴ This rhetoric also illustrated the growing importance of economic factors in building domestic legitimacy.⁵⁵

Thus, by 1960 there had been significant gains in the economy. Production increases were seen most dramatically in the basic industry areas with light industry, food processing, and textile sectors growing more slowly. In the decade of the 1950's

⁵²After Stalin's death in March 1953, the SED announced the adoption of the New Course (change from heavy industry to more consumer production), but because high production quotas and increasing work norms remained, workers demonstrated their discontent in a rebellion on June 17, 1953. This appeared throughout the major industrial regions in the forms of strikes and demonstrations in demanding economic reforms. Between 300,000 and 372,000 workers were involved in over 270 localities. Soviet troops were required in halting the rebellion. See David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 31-33.

⁵³Jonathon Steele, *Inside East Germany: The State That Came in From the Cold* (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 117.

⁵⁴Stanley Radcliffe, *25 Years On- The Two Germanies- 1970*, p. 153.

⁵⁵Ironically, the 1956-60 five-year plan was abandoned in 1958 and replaced by a seven-year plan adopted in order to bring the East German economy in line with the planning periods of the Soviet Union.

investment had grown about 4.5 times and gross industrial output increased by a factor of 2.9.⁵⁶ Although labor shortages continued after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, they were compensated by utilization of women in the work force in growing numbers. In summary, whereas before 1961 the GDR was forced to confront the reality created by postwar reparations, lack of reconstruction aid, and wholesale loss of population; the period after the Berlin Wall construction dramatically changed to one of even greater concentration on economics as a function of system legitimation.

In early 1963, economic reforms (based upon increased reliance on professional economists) were devised at the Sixth SED Party Congress. Its final shape was announced the following June. This was known as the New Economic System (NES) and followed closely on the heels of contemporary Soviet economic developments and experimentation, especially the theories of Yevsie Liberman, a Soviet economist. Overall, the system was based on the use of sound economic principles with the utilization of the profit factor as a key element. It was prompted by a perception that the central planning concept used throughout the Eastern bloc should be reconsidered. In East Germany this concept gave more emphasis to efficiency rather than the amount of tonnage output. The use of incentives and new pricing guidelines helped stop the stifling of innovation and incentives throughout industry. Responsibilities were delegated to various programs throughout eighty group organizations for the different sectors of the economy. The NES decentralized authority to ever lower units of production. Thus, a more flexible and rational pricing system was created while more control over investment, material acquisition, and other input/output factors were granted to the respective enterprises.

The NES ushered in a new era of rapid growth and prosperity, as well as an additional and important means for legitimation. It served to link performance at work with individual citizenship; traditional German work ethics to an East German sense of national identity; and socialist values to factory life. Although dismantled by 1970, the NES had given impetus to the use of economic performance (and rises in consumer well-being) to convince the East German populace of the superiority of the SED's communist way of life.

⁵⁶Eugene K. Keefe, ed., *East Germany- A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1982), p. 127.

The beginning of the 1970's brought greater economic prosperity as new management and organizational techniques continued to pay off for East Germany. Increased attention to the supply industries (which had been neglected in the 1960's), along with more realistic planning, also enabled the gradual improvement of the economy. The importance of accelerating economic growth in this period was demonstrated in the program of the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971 where the concept of the "main task" was initiated. This referred to the acceleration of socialist production and, consequently, further improvement in living and working conditions through intensification, labor productivity, efficiency, and scientific-technological progress.

The main issue facing the political leadership at this time was how to respond to the growing demands for increased varieties of products in an advanced society. It was evident that to accomplish this would entail greater costs for production of these items (because of their complexity and resource requirements). To address this problem on a bloc-wide scale, agreement was reached in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) for greater integration and specialization in what was known as the Complex Program of 1971.⁵⁷ Pooling of resources and parallel production became the centerpiece of bloc economic strategy. Domestically, East Germany concentrated on relevant policies as well:

- 1) To modernize lagging industries through greater imports of capital equipment and complete industrial plants.
- 2) To expand the dairy and meat industries through large-scale imports of grain and livestock feed.
- 3) To acquire key raw materials and industrial commodities to compensate for slow-downs in deliveries from the USSR and other communist countries.⁵⁸

⁵⁷The CMEA was first established by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union in 1949 to integrate the economies of the Soviet bloc. The GDR joined in 1950 and has remained an important member ever since. After the introduction of the economic reforms as seen in the NES, there has been a Soviet move attempting to prevent economic autarky in the Warsaw Pact with "an international socialist division of labor." This has entailed greater specialization in the member countries with the GDR's production of chemicals, electrotechnical devices, electronics, heavy machinery, optics, and precision tools (the so-called key industries) based upon CMEA quotas. Thus, the assigned role of East Germany in CMEA limits its contribution in these areas.

⁵⁸These objectives were taken from; Ronald G. Oechsler, "GDR Performance and Prospects in Trade with the West", in *East-West Trade: The Prospects to 1985* (Washington, D.C.; prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, August 18, 1982), p. 137.

These objectives required the GDR to turn toward the West for help in fulfilling its economic programs.

Beginning in 1973, rising energy costs, rising prices for raw materials, and the Western recession affected the overall growth of the economy. The incremental cost of production per unit continued to rise throughout the decade. Given the average growth rate of national income between 1971 to 1975 of 5.2% and average increases in production of approximately 5%, by the late 1970's the SED was faced with the dilemma of satisfying growing consumer expectations at the same time that economic growth was slowing down.⁵⁹

C. THE GDR ECONOMY TODAY

Because the growth rate of the 1970's (after 1973) was largely financed by Western credits as a result of detente, continuing dependence upon the West has created economic problems for East Germany which remained into the early 1980's (and although not as severe, still exist). These included low agricultural production, rising inflation, and huge foreign debt -- the latter being the most harmful. For example, in 1981 East Germany's total net hard currency debt was estimated at \$11 billion which was the second highest in the Eastern bloc.⁶⁰ This large foreign debt tended to force the GDR into shifting its trade to the FRG to obtain much needed hard currency in order to service its interest and repayment costs.

The nature of the East German centrally planned economy also created economic problems in the 1980's. These idiosyncrasies can be listed as follows:

- 1) Plan inaccuracies caused by the immense task of coordinating over 8000 different economic enterprises. The complexity of maintaining records of performance, productivity, material usage, and so on poses severe problems in planning, especially since much of these data are not computerized.
- 2) Waste of raw materials which decreases productivity and rises the overall costs of resources.
- 3) Inaccurate pricing which does not include supply and demand considerations.
- 4) Waste of labor as a result of the socialist necessity to retain inefficient workers, and the loss of work time because of the cumbersome supply system.
- 5) The neglect of economic infrastructure, especially in outdated institutions, data processing, and communications.
- 6) Low capital return and productivity from investments.

⁵⁹Eugene K. Keefe, ed., *East Germany*, p. 130.

⁶⁰*Handbook of Statistics- 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, September 1985), p. 48.

- 7) Organizational instability caused by the constant search for solutions to the economic problems.⁶¹
- 8) Uncertain allocation of authority resulting from ambiguous relationships such as those between the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee, economic departments, or the economic planners in the State Planning Commission and economic administrators of the Council of Ministers.⁶²

The 1981-1985 five-year plan, unveiled in April 1981 at the Tenth SED Party Congress, attempted to solve, with some success, these problems inherent in the economic system. It encompassed a series of strategies to overcome deficiencies and continue economic prosperity:

- 1) More rational investment and technological innovation, especially through automation, robotics, and microelectronics.
- 2) Conservation and recycling of raw materials through education and modernization, and more efficient use of energy and equipment.
- 3) Reduction of imports and maximization of exports.
- 4) Reformation of labor utilization to increase efficiency.

These strategies have been coined "comprehensive intensification" and with the end of this five-year plan have apparently brought positive results. Consequently, 1984 was considered to be the best since the founding of the GDR:

On paper, 1984, which marked the much-publicized 35th anniversary of the GDR's foundation, was, at least economically, "the most successful year" in East German history. The statistics certainly look impressive. Overfulfilled planning goals, a record growth in national income, a bumper harvest, and the GDR's first foreign trade surplus point to a remarkable recovery from the shortfalls of the early 1980's.⁶³

This success was repeated in 1985 with substantial increases in national income, production of industrial goods, and agricultural harvests. In addition, the GDR had an overall trade surplus for the third straight year along with full rehabilitation of credit worthiness in the West as evidenced by a new \$600,000,000 loan signed by a consortium of Western banks.⁶⁴ This economic comeback has been accomplished more than anything else because of greater austerity and debt consolidation.

⁶¹Three structural reforms have been accomplished in the economy in the last twenty years; however, they were poorly implemented and full of uncertainties.

⁶²These economic problems are identified and explained in greater detail in C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany*, pp. 69-76.

⁶³B.V. Flow, "The East German Economy-What is Behind the Success Story?" *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Report 23, 15 March 1985), p. 1.

⁶⁴B.V. Flow, "5 More Years of "Comprehensive Intensification" for the GDR's Economy", *Radio Free Europe Research*, (RAD Report 6, 17 January 1986), p. 2.

Thus, by 1985 the GDR economy had recovered from the situation of the early 1980's. The regime has pointed to this recovery as a signal that the SED is leading the country to greatness. In fact, the official figures for 1984 and 1985 were the most detailed ever published, exhibiting the importance of letting the people know when the economy (and hence regime) succeeded. The emphasis on economic well-being on a personal level is also a direct result of the utilization of economics as a legitimizing device in East Germany.

D. CONSUMER SATISFACTION

While material incentives to stimulate individual and factory performance have always played a prominent role in Soviet-type systems, they became the *primary* source of motivation, the decisive "economic lever" of the economic reform efforts of the GDR.⁶⁵

The emphasis which the SED places on consumer living standards can easily be seen when compared to other similar Warsaw Pact countries. Table I illustrates a general economic profile of East Germany in 1984. As is readily evident, both overall GNP and per capita GNP were the highest in the Warsaw Pact, including the USSR. Energy consumption was second only to Poland (a country with over twice the population of the GDR) in the non-Soviet bloc countries, and first in total exports and imports of the six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations.

Table II contains data which serve as indicators of living standards in Eastern Europe. The GDR leads all other countries in each of these areas, exhibiting that the regime continues to strive to increase individual welfare. Automobiles are owned by 42% of all East German households and almost all have refrigerators. Ninety percent own televisions, 84% washing machines, 64% hot water, 68% baths, and 60% inside toilets.⁶⁶ Given the fact that the SED is able to deliver life's necessities better than other communist nations, the people may be motivated to put forth greater effort in the construction of socialism. This accomplishment is also a source of pride for the government in the attempt to build an East German identity.

⁶⁵Hartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970's," p. 4.

⁶⁶"German Economy on Top of East Bloc Heap," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 3 October 1984, p. 11.

TABLE I
ECONOMIC PROFILE (GDR AND COMECON)

| | *GNP | Per Cap GNP | Energy | Exports | Imports |
|----------|--------|-------------|--------|---------|---------|
| GDR | 163.7 | 9800 | 1.4 | 25.2 | 23.0 |
| Bulgaria | 56.4 | 6270 | 0.2 | 12.8 | 12.7 |
| Czech. | 127.9 | 8250 | 1.0 | 17.4 | 17.6 |
| Hungary | 77.0 | 7200 | 0.3 | 16.3 | 15.6 |
| Poland | 228.5 | 6190 | 2.5 | 17.4 | 16.2 |
| Romania | 117.6 | 5200 | 1.1 | 12.0 | 9.9 |
| USSR | 1957.6 | 7120 | 30.0 | 91.5 | 80.4 |

*GNP= billions of US dollars
 Per Capita GNP= US dollars
 Energy= millions of barrels/day oil equivalent
 Exports/Imports= billions of US dollars

Source:
CIA Handbook of Statistics (Washington, D.C.:
 Central Intelligence Agency, September 1985), Table 3.

The latest 1986 official economic targets also echo the traditional East German concern for the consumer sector. Although, overall popular consumption is to remain unchanged from 1985, tighter regulations for quality control on consumer goods, improved supplies of spare parts for consumer products, a 6% rise in the private services sector (this was 4.2% in 1985), and a 15% increase in auto maintenance services are planned for the coming year.⁶⁷ Therefore, even as the economic situation in the GDR may wax and wane, the consumer is still extremely important in the eyes of the regime, and the East German economy is the most "legitimate" in this respect within the socialist camp. Indeed, SED concern over a slowdown in the rise in the

⁶⁷B.V. Flow, "5 More Years of "Comprehensive Intensification" for the GDR's Economy," p. 5.

TABLE II
INDICATORS OF LIVING STANDARDS-1984

| | GDR | Bulg. | Czech. | Hung. | Poland | Rom. |
|-----------------------|------|-------|--------|-------|--------|------|
| Autos* | 168 | 99 | 159 | 110 | 80 | 11 |
| Energy Usage* | 40 | 29 | 35 | 20 | 24 | 22 |
| Life Expectancy | 72 | 71 | 71 | 70 | 71 | 70 |
| Daily Calories (1977) | 3644 | 3578 | 3457 | 3520 | 3619 | 3448 |
| % Houses w/elec. | 100 | 99.8 | 99.7 | 94.3 | NA | 48.6 |

*Autos=number per 1000 persons

*Energy=barrels/day oil equivalent per capita

Sources:

CIA Handbook of Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, September 1985), Table 3;
East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980's, Report Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 28 October 1985), pp. 253,259.

standard of living may explain the huge hard currency cushion possessed by the GDR (somewhere between \$4 billion and \$6 billion) which provides a hedge against forced price rises or investments detracting from the consumer sector.

E. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

As a member of the Warsaw Pact's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA), East Germany faces external constraints upon its economic relations with other states. The 1985 CMEA Council meeting in June highlighted the future emphasis on "socialist integration" centered around five goals:

... close coordination of national five-year plans so as to dovetail production programs; conclusion of special long-term cooperative agreements, such as in extracting and transporting Soviet natural gas or conserving on energy

consumption; elaboration of a joint plan of action for scientific and technical work; a continued high concentration of trading within the bloc, with special emphasis on the delivery of quality goods and consumer durables from Eastern Europe to the USSR; and limitation on trade and other economic links with the West.⁶⁸

These stated goals serve to limit the East Germans from moving further away from decentralizing the economy and increasing economic ties with the West, especially with West Germany.

Since over one-half of East Germany's Western trade is with the FRG, inter-German relations are especially important to the SED's search for legitimacy. The SED has reaped tremendous economic benefits from this relationship. Besides the usual trade which is carried out with West Germany, there are other incomes in the form of transit fees (DM 500 million); postal payments (DM 200 million); road tolls (DM 50 million); income for obligatory currency exchanges (DM 200 million), sewer and waste disposal (DM 100 million); earnings from foreign currency shops (DM 1 billion); the guaranteed credit or "swing" (DM 850 million); and ransoming of political prisoners (DM 200 million).⁶⁹ In addition, the ability to funnel exports through West Germany to obtain hard currency (a feat that other CMEA countries cannot do as easily) makes the GDR an unofficial member of the EEC. This favored relationship is worth at least DM 1 billion. According to Jonathon Dean, when this is all added to the value of recent loans of over DM 700 million per year it can be estimated that the GDR gains approximately DM 5 billion annually from its relationship with West Germany.⁷⁰

Economics will remain a major tool in attaining legitimacy for the SED. Poor in natural resources and energy, East Germany must depend upon foreign trade to maintain economic health and hence, consumer satisfaction. Therefore, any analysis of East German foreign policy must always consider the economic aspect in addition to other variables. However, the functions of economics in the East German case cannot be separated from its role as a contributor to regime legitimacy and stability. The importance of trade with both the East and the West has placed the East Germans in a

⁶⁸Vladimir V. Kusin, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (January-February 1986), p. 42.

⁶⁹Jonathon Dean, "Directions in Inner-German Relations," *Orbis* (Fall, 1985), p. 612.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 612.

unique position between the two blocs, and affects the relationships which are discussed in the following sections.

IV. LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY IN EAST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. SOVIET AND INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS

1. The German Legacy

Any attempt at examining East German foreign policy must be accomplished within the context of the relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union, and the GDR and West Germany. Because East German foreign policy today has largely evolved from the postwar division of Germany, the evolution of the two different nations has taken place within the context of inter-German relations, albeit under the watchful eye of the USSR. This Soviet influence in the GDR directly limits the level, and largely determines the nature, of inter-German relations carried out by the SED. Therefore, the inter-German situation, and the Soviet-GDR relationship which affects it, provide a good starting point for the overall foreign policies of East Germany. To better understand this, some important postwar differences in the two Germanies need to be emphasized.

The forced Soviet alliance after World War II brought political impotence as well as economic ruin to what was to become the GDR. In contrast, the Federal Republic of Germany was accorded the privilege of pursuing economic, security, and legitimacy goals without the massive reparations and exploitation experienced by the East Germans. The West German population was more supportive of her occupiers than were the people in the Soviet Occupation Zone. Bonn's dependency on the major international influence of the United States, Great Britain, and France served to enhance her position as the new Germany. This became even more meaningful after the joining of the three allied zones combined the political power of these Western nations on the side of what was to be called the Federal Republic of Germany. In contrast, by 1949 the Soviets were viewed as oppressive and tyrannical throughout much of the world when their policies in the occupied East European countries became evident. Immediate economic aid from the United States in the form of the Marshall Plan eased human suffering in the Allied zones, and a capitalistic, market-oriented economy similar to that of prewar Germany began to evolve. In the Soviet zones, a drastically different system of socialist economic ideas was set up -- a system introduced into a severely damaged economic infrastructure made worse by Soviet

reparations well into the early 1950's.⁷¹ These differences between the two Germanies exaggerated the "legitimacy gap" for the next twenty-five years; the FRG seemed to be the only "real" Germany while the German Democratic Republic appeared as simply another of the Soviet occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

This legacy has created four major priorities in East German foreign policy which continue today: (1) to assure continued growth of foreign trade and expansion of the economy to promote popular well-being (and subsequent popular support); (2) to improve stability and legitimacy by obtaining worldwide recognition of SED rule and GDR sovereignty; (3) to avoid those conflicts between the two superpowers which could damage or even destroy the SED regime. This could include a European war which no doubt would be conducted on East German (as well as West German) soil; and (4) to remain the most loyal and helpful ally of the Soviet Union in order to reap political and economic benefits.⁷² Today, all of these goals become important in analyzing GDR foreign policy, and are all related to legitimacy and stability concerns. In writing of the newest phases of the inter-German detente of the 1980's, Melvin Croan states:

... it involves a deviation based neither on traditional nationalist considerations, nor on pacifism (a sentiment abroad in the land but anathema to its communist rulers), nor on calculations of economic self-interest in any narrow sense, as has been implied in some of the best-informed Western reportage. At stake rather is a complex process in which, contrary to the initial expectations of the SED leadership, detente has become a cornerstone of East Germany's internal political stability and the virtual centerpiece of the SED's continuing quest for legitimacy.⁷³

And Hartmut Zimmerman emphasizes a similar aspect:

The interests and the behavior of the GDR in its foreign relations have been determined by the fact that the state must look upon itself as a strictly *political* entity, since it lacks the additional legitimization of a *national* identity,

⁷¹Wholesale confiscation, dismantling, destruction, and expropriation by the Soviets dominated the economic life of the eastern zones of occupation. For example, more than 200 industrial concerns were turned into joint stock companies by the Soviets and remained so until 1953. For a good discussion of postwar Soviet economic policy in the Soviet Occupation Zone see J.P. Nettl, *The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany- 1945-1950* (New York: Octagon Books, 1977).

⁷²This contributes to a maintenance of a certain amount of autonomy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which also provides a perception of legitimacy for the GDR government.

⁷³Melvin Croan, "The Politics of Division and Detente in East Germany," *Current History* (November 1985), p. 369.

which would enable it to safeguard the continuity of its existence as a state without tying that existence to the maintenance of present political-institutional forms.⁷⁴

2. The Soviet Connection

In viewing the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic, it is a common perception in the West to simply attribute East German policy and actions to Soviet desires. To a large extent, this is correct. However, the importance of the GDR to the Soviet Union ensures a continued high Russian stake in East German regime stability, and it is in this connection that East Berlin succeeds in limiting the direct control exerted from the Kremlin. To understand this relationship it is necessary to explain the functions which the GDR serves for the Soviet Union.

First, the GDR serves as one of the most important states as part of the East European buffer zone (from the Soviet perspective).⁷⁵ Its strategic position is vital to the maintenance of the political and military hegemony of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe. Angela Stent goes so far as to call the GDR "the political-military bulwark of the Soviet security system in Eastern Europe".⁷⁶ In this respect, the nineteen Soviet divisions deployed in Germany form the front line against any aggression from the West or, conversely, provide the forward forces with which to launch military operations if necessary for "defensive purposes." Second, its continued existence guarantees against a reunited and revanchist Germany which had cost so much in human and material sacrifices to defeat in the Great Patriotic War. Third, as mentioned in the last section, East German economic and technological assistance is vital to the Soviet Union, more vital than similar assistance from other countries. Fourth, the continued loyalty to the Soviet Union and close duplication of its political system in the GDR lends credibility and legitimacy to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Fifth, the GDR provides opportunities for Soviet influence in West Germany and consequently, leverage in the Western alliance.

⁷⁴Hartmut Zimmerman, "The GDR in the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (March-April 1978), p. 11.

⁷⁵Regarding the idea of the GDR as a buffer state, Vernon Aspaturian also considers all of Eastern Europe as either a buffer zone, a defense glacis, or a springboard for Soviet westward expansion; one choice seems to be as valid as another. See his article, "Eastern Europe in World Perspective" in *Communism in Eastern Europe*, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).

⁷⁶Angela Stent, "The USSR and Germany," *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1981), p. 3.

On the other hand, the GDR could not survive without the Soviet Union. Although East Germany has gained diplomatic recognition and other important relationships in the world, the USSR remains its central and most important ally. The SED depends upon the continued division of Germany for its political existence, and the Soviet Union is the guarantor of that division. In addition, the GDR is dependent on the Soviet Union for the majority of its raw materials and energy which creates an important means of influence for the USSR, but not without its costs:

The GDR's almost total dependence on Soviet raw material imports represents a drain on Soviet resources and is particularly problematic in the energy field. In 1970, 7% of all GDR exports to the Soviet Union went toward paying for oil. In 1980 the figure was 25%, with a predicted 35% by 1985.⁷⁷

Thus, the relationship with the Soviet Union in the eyes of the SED is extremely important and all foreign policy considerations must include these vital ties with the USSR.

3. The German Question

The most important issue which has consistently been addressed in the foreign policies of both Germanies is the so-called "German Question." Initially involving the reunification issue, this term has evolved to encompass many inter-German issues, or simply, the inter-German relationship. Because of the importance placed upon the GDR by the Soviet Union, it is this area upon which I will concentrate in order to examine the relationship of legitimacy and stability concerns in East German interactions with the USSR. The developments upon which I focus in this section include:

- 1) The period of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and Walter Ulbricht's intransigence in East Germany.
- 2) The Honecker policy of *Abgrenzung* (delimitation).
- 3) The official "damage limitation" policy after NATO deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles forces (INF) in 1983. This brought about the "new *Deutschlandpolitik*" of the mid-1980's and renewed tensions with Moscow.

These issues will be briefly outlined and then related within the legitimacy/stability matrix. The four L/S goals are applied to demonstrate legitimacy and stability concerns as motivators of policy in each situation.

⁷⁷Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, ed. S.M. Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 45.

4. Ostpolitik

The first two decades of the division of Germany involved a stalemate of national wills between the United States and her Western allies on the one hand, and the Soviet bloc countries on the other. This stalemate was a direct product of the foreign policies of the two superpowers:

During the 1950's and 1960's, the German question had two major variables: the role of the two Germanies in an international system focused on the cold war, and the foreign and German policies of Bonn and Berlin themselves. With both of these factors remaining more or less constant, the situation between the two Germanies was at an impasse. As by-products of the East-West confrontation, with their very existence firmly imbedded in that milieu, it was inevitable that the latter erosion of the bipolar system and the emergence of impulses for some form of East-West accommodation would pose serious challenges for both Bonn and East Berlin.⁷⁸

By the mid-1960's the West German policy of official non-recognition of the GDR, as embodied in the Hallstein Doctrine, was becoming increasingly dysfunctional.⁷⁹ This change of thought in West German policy placed the relative diplomatic position of Walter Ulbricht and the SED in a stronger bargaining position. Since the Berlin Wall, the introduction of the NES, and the consequent rise in the standard of living in East Germany, popular support for the Ulbricht government had expanded, albeit in subtle increments. Aggressive GDR policies toward the FRG also limited personal contacts and created a *cordon sanitaire* against Western influences. However, by the late 1960's a policy dilemma confronted the East German leadership. Although the GDR depended upon the continued division of Germany for its existence, it paradoxically constituted a direct challenge to the popularly perceived legitimacy of the state, especially if relations remained hostile or formal recognition from the FRG was not forthcoming (because West Germany continued to be the only internationally recognized German nation). It was becoming imperative to gain recognition from the

⁷⁸Ronald Asmus, "Bonn and East Berlin: The 'New' German Question?", *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Report 20, 14 March 1985), p. 49.

⁷⁹The Hallstein Doctrine was the major foreign policy strategy used by the FRG against East Germany for the first twenty-five years after the war. Officially established on December 9, 1955, the doctrine was based upon the West German ability, through her diplomatic and economic clout, to convince most other countries in the world to deny recognition to the SED regime and a separate East Germany. This was motivated in part by the expectation that German reunification was still a probability and not just a possibility.

"other" Germany to provide domestic legitimacy for the regime; but it would require the Soviet Union, not Ulbricht, to bring about the change which would address this dilemma.

In the strategy of GDR "self-preservation" which was pursued until 1970, political stability and legitimacy were linked to the belief that East Germany was historically and socially more advanced than the FRG. In this situation, reunification and closer inter-German cooperation could only be based on the assurance that East Germany could maintain her ideological and socialist achievements. Given the nature of East German intransigence (and as the chances for reunification declined), the continued isolation of the GDR was a certainty without some sort of accommodation by one or both Germanies, or at least by the East-West superpowers and their respective allies.

As the new Social Democrats under Chancellor Willy Brandt came to power in the FRG in 1969, a willingness to normalize relations with the Soviet Union became more evident. Well before the West German Social Democrats' introduction of *Ostpolitik*, the Soviets had been influenced to closer ties with Bonn by many factors:

- 1) The fall of De Gaulle in early 1969 accentuated the gradual shift of France back to the Atlantic alliance and away from the general focus of previous Soviet efforts at *detente*.
- 2) The emergence of China from isolation and its increased involvement in opening discussions with the West threatened to isolate the USSR in its foreign policy actions.
- 3) The Soviets were experiencing growing economic problems which forced the Kremlin to look closer at increasing industrial and technological ties with the West.
- 4) As the Soviets were close to attaining nuclear parity with the United States, the concern to stabilize the arms race (either to maintain this parity or obtain nuclear superiority) motivated improved relations with the United States. The new SPD/FDP coalition and their overtures provided a means to accomplish this.
- 5) In addition, the FRG seemed to provide the means to gain influence in order to undermine the Atlantic Alliance and draw Bonn closer to the East.⁸⁰
- 6) Lastly, it was important to the Soviets to gain recognition for East Germany and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, while at the same time, preventing the development of closer ties between Bonn and Peking.

⁸⁰In this regard William E. Griffith writes: "The Soviet Union intended to use *Ostpolitik* to prevent Western Europe from becoming politically or, worse, militarily or, worst of all, thermonuclearly united and, in particular, to prevent the Federal Republic from becoming dominant in Western Europe, obtaining independent access to nuclear weapons, or otherwise greatly increasing its military strength." William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England; The MIT Press, 1978), pp. 163-164.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 gave increased impetus to Moscow to reach some sort of settlement with the West which would legitimize Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, possibly preventing the appearance of future Czechoslovakias. F. Stephen Larrabee adopts this line of thought:

As long as the West had not accepted the postwar status quo, a threat to Soviet hegemony existed, however latent. This consideration pointed, above all, to the need for intensified efforts to achieve some sort of a settlement with Bonn, for it had become increasingly clear that the Federal Republic held the keys to the solution of the outstanding issues of European politics--the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the acceptance of the GDR.⁸¹

Given this situation, then why was there a two-year crisis between Ulbricht and the Kremlin after the Soviet decision was made to respond to the overtures from Willy Brandt and the West German leadership in 1969? The answers possibly lie in the prerequisites demanded by the GDR leadership before normal relations could be negotiated. These included:

- 1) Full unqualified recognition of GDR sovereignty.
- 2) An agreement by West Germany not to impede GDR pursuit of diplomatic relations internationally.
- 3) The establishment of a permanent Four-Power status in Berlin with an avenue for future control by the GDR.
- 4) The renunciation of any future special relations between the German nations.

These preconditions all embodied the insecurity traditionally experienced by the East German government.

The subsequent West German-Soviet negotiations which began on January 30, 1970 forced the GDR to consent reluctantly to open its own dialogue with its western counterpart. However, Ulbricht continued his opposition even after the signing of the Soviet-West German Treaty in August.⁸² He became increasingly obstinate concerning the compromise over GDR recognition and the Berlin quadripartite talks. As a result of Soviet pressure, Ulbricht perceived three challenges to his regime during this time:

⁸¹F. Stephen Larrabee, "Moscow and the German Question: Continuities and Changes," *Problems of Communism* (March-April 1981), p. 69.

⁸²For a more detailed discussion of the Ulbricht opposition to detente see Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance: The Politics of Detente* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978); and William E. Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press, 1978).

- 1) An inherent danger to regime stability and legitimacy resulting from increased inter-German dialogue and greater interaction between East and West Germans.
- 2) The end to the chance of liquidating the Four-power status of Berlin which would enable the "island" of the West to continue to exist as a direct challenge to East German sovereignty.
- 3) The perception of Soviet manipulation which could result from a reversal of traditional East German policies in relations with West Germany. This could harm regime credibility from a sovereignty standpoint. Any evidence of real autonomy would be completely discredited.

It is no coincidence that all three of these problems reflected legitimacy/stability concerns.

The *Ostpolitik* dispute with the Kremlin seems inevitable when the particular combination of legitimacy/stability goals are analyzed in the matrix in Figure 4.1. The matrix illustrates the L/S factors which were motivations for Ulbricht and the SED leadership in the dispute, and it is evident that the GDR perceived all four L/S goals as being affected by negotiating with the FRG:

- 1) The possibility of increased inter-German contacts served to detract from the creation of a separate East German national identity by potentially bridging the man-made cultural gap between the two countries. As new relationships and interactions on a personal level became possible, the SED perceived threats to attaining national identity goals.
- 2) Sovereignty goals would be harmed because of the evidence of Soviet manipulation in any policy change to an environment of inter-German detente, and the continuing "island" of West Berlin was anathema to Ulbricht in relation to GDR sovereignty. Increased Soviet trade with the FRG would decrease GDR influence, and closer ties could make reunification a remote, but real possibility.
- 3) Ideology goals were affected in that the *status quo* was to be recognized -- a policy diametrically opposed to the past themes of East German propaganda.
- 4) Social goals would be affected by the increased ability of East German citizens to compare their lot with their Western counterparts through the increased contacts with relatives and friends from the West. Greater expectations could arise which could not be realized in the near future.

When viewed from this perspective, the reasons for the Soviet-SED dispute then become clearer.

The disagreement was finally settled by the Soviets. The direct result was the ouster of Ulbricht in 1971 and the series of negotiations and treaties between the East and West throughout the next few years. The watershed of these negotiations (for the two Germanies) was the Basic Treaty signed in December 1972. A new era in SED policy had begun.

| L/S GOALS* | HIGH | LOW |
|--------------------------|------|-----|
| <i>National Identity</i> | X | |
| <i>Sovereignty</i> | X | |
| <i>Ideology</i> | X | |
| <i>Social Policy</i> | X | |

**Legitimacy/Stability (L/S) Motivations
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Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the East German "nation."

2. *Sovereignty goals* motivate policies which tend to illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and hence sovereignty.

3. *Ideology goals* are met by advocating the inherent "rightness" of the East German social and political system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration and limited contact would serve to protect ideological foundations.

4. *Social goals* encompass all those policies which are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.

Figure 4.1 Soviet-GDR Dispute Over Ostpolitik.

5. Abgrenzung

Walter Ulbricht's removal after the beginning of East-West detente brought into play a second strategy along with a new leader, Erich Honecker. This strategy was based upon the realization that there would not be a unified German entity. Long-awaited international recognition for the GDR, as well as West German recognition, served to underwrite the permanency of the division and legitimize the East German regime.

As Erich Honecker took over the reins of power, East German frustrations with the forced detente with the FRG were heightened by the realization that the dramatic increases in East-West German contacts were becoming a reality for the first time since 1961. The logical response on their part was the initiation of the policy of *Abgrenzung* (delimitation). This policy was aimed at constantly monitoring the influence of the West and minimizing its impact on East German L. S. goals:

This entailed stepped-up ideological vigilance for party members, increased military and ideological instruction in the schools, as well as the sudden categorization of more than one million East Germans as 'carriers of state secrets' banned from any Western contacts.⁸³

In *Abgrenzung* the separateness of the two German nations was stressed and the German question was considered closed by East Berlin. This produced what was to color the inter-German negotiations for the remainder of the decade, namely, a series of incremental steps with a tedious and tender approach to the GDR by the FRG (and with the legitimacy/stability needs of East Germany always in mind). This was the nature of the dialogue during the West German Social Democratic Party's (SPD's) *Deutschlandpolitik*.⁸⁴ West Germany could only hope to open inter-German dialogue and keep the hope for reunification alive by promoting stability in the GDR; for as long as any perceived threats to the SED regime existed, negotiations would probably remain elusive. West Germany attained this by making overtures and one-sided concessions while, at the same time, attempting to gain some advantages for the FRG (mainly in the forms of citizen contacts and emigration policy). West Germany's

⁸³Ronald Asmus, "Bonn and East Berlin: The 'New' German Question?" *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Report/20, 14 March 1985), p. 51.

⁸⁴For a discussion of the SPD's policy, see Walter Leisler Kiep, "The New *Deutschlandpolitik*," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1984-1985), and Michael Stürmer, "Making Sense of *Deutschlandpolitik*," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1986).

punishment policies of the pre-detente era hence gave way to positive reinforcement in the guise of such programs as the "swing" credit fostered as an incentive to soften the hard currency exchange requirements in East Berlin.⁸⁵

Applying the L/S matrix to the policy of *Abgrenzung* in Figure 4.2, it is evident again that legitimacy and stability goals were paramount. Three of the four L/S goals were in play:

1. National identity goals were perceived as important because interaction between East and West Germans could influence the societal barriers which had so painstakingly been constructed by the SED, and subsequent policy was created to de-emphasize an overall "Germanness" in favor of a Prussian or East German nationalism.⁸⁶ The concerns mirrored in the dispute over *Ostpolitik* were addressed in *Abgrenzung*.
2. Motivations as a result of the pursuit of sovereignty goals were not as important. The international recognition given to the GDR by admission to the United Nations, as well as the diplomatic homage paid by the FRG (in stark contrast with the past), could only aid in this regard. Therefore, sovereignty would not be harmed, but actually helped if equal treatment and diplomatic interaction continued as a result of closer contacts.
3. Ideological goals were motivations for delimitation because of the need to minimize the desirable aspects of Western culture, which became accessible through more open interaction. In addition, detente had made it more difficult to chastise the FRG while simultaneously improving relations. The "rightness" of Marxism/Leninism could be damaged if *Abgrenzung* was not upheld.
4. Social goals were influenced because of the possible effect that inter-German rapprochement would have on the massive political socialization which had been occurring in East Germany for years. The apparition of increased contacts with West Germans and consequent comparisons of life in the two countries could spark consumer and political dissent similar to that before 1961.

There is a marked similarity to the concerns of the SED leadership in *Abgrenzung* and the *Ostpolitik* dispute. However, in *Abgrenzung* sovereignty goals were not as important because diplomatic recognition and contacts did not appear to be involved in Honecker's internal policy of delimitation. Consequently, sovereignty goals were not pursued as energetically as national identity, ideology, and social goals.

⁸⁵The "swing" is a permanent interest-free credit from West Germany to East Germany as a result of the Berlin Agreement of 1951.

⁸⁶Into the mid-1970's Honecker was forced to intensify the creation of an East German national identity. By 1976 signs of elite and mass discontent appeared as a result of the Helsinki Final Act which prompted more than one hundred thousand East Germans to apply for emigration to West Germany. In addition, the regime's deprivation of the balladeer Wolf Biermann's citizenship; the house arrest of dissident intellectual Robert Havemann; and the later deportation of many other prominent dissidents contributed to the growing atmosphere of popular discontent. Combined with the decreasing fear of the regime by the population, the SED was forced to justify its existence again because (at least in part) of *Ostpolitik*. Although by the end of 1976, when most public expressions of discontent had been quashed, it was evident to Honecker that a greater sense of national identity must be created; thus, the emphasis on German history and nationalism which best fit the socialist and Prussian legacies was increased at this time.

| L/S GOALS* | HIGH | LOW |
|--------------------------|------|-----|
| <i>National Identity</i> | X | |
| <i>Sovereignty</i> | | X |
| <i>Ideology</i> | X | |
| <i>Social Policy</i> | X | |

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Policy Example: official help in increasing reception of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.

Figure 4.2 The Abgrenzung (Delimitation) Policy.

Abgrenzung has continued into the present with various levels of intensity and, depending upon the nature of the East-West relationship, will remain a policy at the disposal of the SED. Whenever the ties with West Germany seem to be negatively affecting the domestic attitudes and opinions of the people, delimitation of inter-German contact again sets in. However, *Abgrenzung* served its most important role in the period immediately following detente.

6. Damage Limitation

By the end of the 1970's, there had evolved new East German attitudes toward the FRG. West German ties had become a positive factor for political stability. It was readily apparent that the SED had become more effective in dealing with its citizens in an environment of inter-German ties. Although *Abgrenzung* continued, expert control of the population through the security structure and sophisticated handling of potential domestic problems (using the domestic implements described earlier) contributed to the neutralization of any SED qualms in dealing with West Germany. In addition, the regime's efforts at building a subtle consensus with its population through a "Teutonic Ghoulash Communism" had become dependent upon continued economic infusions from the West Germans. Lastly, detente had opened the way for the viability of the GDR as an international actor. Therefore, East-West detente had become an important part of Honecker's more self-confident and secure regime.

Beginning in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the NATO dual-track discussions over INF heralded a change in East-West relations. This was especially true as the GDR linked the future of inter-German relations to the INF issue as part of the overall Soviet strategy. This was partially justified by the Soviet Union (and the GDR) through existing treaties between East and West. A Soviet article stated:

West Germany is committed under the Moscow Treaties to contribute in every way to the assertion of the principle of non-use of force and of renunciation of the threat of force in relations with eastern neighbors.⁸⁷

⁸⁷Roland Smith, "Soviet Policy Towards West Germany," *Adelphi Papers*, number 203 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1985), p. 24.

In response, Helmut Kohl's new Christian Democrat and Free Democrat (CDU/FDP) coalition which had come to power in 1982 continued the attempt to disengage the INF issue by carrying on normal relations and actually increasing ties in the economic realm. This was evidenced in June 1983 with the granting of a DM 1 billion banking credit by a West German bank consortium and guaranteed by the West German government.⁸⁸ This seemed to be an open sign from West Germany of the desire to continue inter-German relations as before.

With the actual start of deployments in November 1983, U.S.-Soviet relations reached a new low in the post-detente era. Arms control talks were broken off, but inter-German relations continued to be unaffected. In a speech at the end of November 1983, Erich Honecker introduced the policy of "damage limitation" relative to relations with Bonn. Following this, in January 1984 Honecker expressed optimism for future superpower arms control talks in an interview for the French communist weekly *Revolution*, exhibiting a stance distinctly opposite that recently portrayed by Moscow.⁸⁹ In addition, East Germany turned over the surface rapid transit system (S-Bahn) in West Berlin to FRG administration on January 9 -- a system which had been under the control of East Berlin since World War II. The agreement was perceived by the West as another landmark sign of East German desires for detente despite East-West tensions over INF.⁹⁰ Therefore, as the Soviets continued to cool relations with the West, it appeared that the East Germans were conducting business as usual. In fact, at one point during this period, the GDR carried on fourteen different forums with West Germany.⁹¹ This was the beginning of a new diverging direction vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Following the publication of an article by Hungarian Matyas Szuros in January 1984 (sympathetic to the East German position), a chain of media polemics began in Eastern Europe which opened the discord to Western view.⁹² Hungary, siding

⁸⁸Ronald Asmus, "Rapprochement with Bonn," in *Soviet/East European Survey, 1983-1984*, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 238.

⁸⁹Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Detente and Discord: The Moscow-East Berlin-Bonn Triangle," *Orbis* (Winter 1985), p. 749. Also see Honecker's interview in *Revolution*, January 6, 1984.

⁹⁰"Berlin Subway Pact Has Echoes of Detente," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 January 1984, International Section, p. 7.

⁹¹Ronald Asmus, "The Dialectics of Detente . . .", p. 748.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 745. The Hungarian article was printed as "The Reciprocal Effect of National and International Interests in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," by

with the Honecker position, gently rebuffed the low-keyed berating from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union over too much independent foreign policy. Thus by the Spring of 1984 an evident dispute had arisen between the Soviets and the East Germans over relations with Bonn in the wake of INF deployment. Ironically, in just over ten years the new Soviet-East German dispute involved switched roles with the same actors. Ronald Asmus describes the new characteristics as compared to *Ostpolitik*:

In the late 1960's and early 1970's it was essentially Ulbricht and the East German regime that were stressing the perils of West German "revanchism" and arguing that any opening to the FRG not on Eastern terms -- full *de jure* diplomatic recognition of East Berlin by Bonn -- was fraught with dangers for domestic political stability and foreign policy credibility. In Moscow, on the other hand, the Soviet leaders, while certainly concerned about political stability in the GDR, sometimes differed from the East German leadership, particularly Ulbricht, in their view of the risks and costs of detente. Confronted with the choice of supporting Ulbricht's maximalist demands or moving ahead with its own efforts to reach compromises with Bonn that might enable it to achieve one of its most sought after foreign policy goals of the postwar period, Western recognition of the territorial status quo, Moscow chose to subordinate East German demands to larger considerations.

The irony of history is that in 1984 the issues were essentially the same, but with the rôles reversed. It was now Moscow that was harping on the dangers of West German "revanchism", bluntly reminding East Berlin of Bonn's attempt to gain "levers of influence" through credits and other means and serving notice that the West Germans had to be appropriately punished for their support of INF deployment in order to protect the credibility of Warsaw Pact diplomacy. . . . In sharp contrast, East Berlin was soothingly urging a "coalition of reason" between the two Germanies in order to "limit the damage" in East-West relations

The dispute was largely settled with the cancellation of the much-heralded visit of Erich Honecker to the FRG in September 1984. It seems Moscow had tolerated enough and the reins had been tightened once again. What were the goals at stake in this new set of tensions between Moscow and East Berlin? Figure 4.3 illustrates the L.S goals for the period of "damage limitation". Three of the four categories were affected: sovereignty goals, ideological goals, and social goals:

1. National identity goals were less important as motivators because the continued relationship with West Germany could not really aid in separating the two Germanies and their populations into two nations, to the contrary, it would tend to bring them closer.

Matyas Szuros in *Társadalmi Szemle* (No. 1, January 1984), pp. 13-21. It advocated the adoption of more nationalist oriented policies in a radically refined perception of bloc cooperation and interaction.

⁹³Ronald Asmus, "The Soviet-East German Dispute Revisited," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAID Report 66, 16 July 1985), p. 2.

| L/S GOALS* | HIGH | LOW |
|--------------------------|------|-----|
| <i>National Identity</i> | | X |
| <i>Sovereignty</i> | X | |
| <i>Ideology</i> | X | |
| <i>Social Policy</i> | X | |

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Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and hence sovereignty.

3. *Ideology goals* are met by advocating the inherent "rightness" of the East German social and political system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration and limited contact would serve to protect ideological foundations.

4. *Social goals* encompass all those policies which are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.

Figure 4.3 Soviet-GDR Discord Over Damage Limitation.

2. Sovereignty goals were involved for the same reasons as in the *Ostpolitik* dispute. East German relations with West Germany were in danger of being controlled completely by Moscow, consequently undermining the regime's legitimacy which had become intertwined with continued special ties with West Germany. This became more important as the policy of "damage limitation" gained favor in Western countries and served to increase international prestige for East Berlin.
3. Ideological goals were pursued for similar reasons as seen in the previous issues. Although not unprecedented, an extreme change of policy direction would be very difficult to explain in terms of ideology, especially after the recent turn-around in the early 1970's. Continuity in inter-German relations had shown itself to be an important element in this regard.
4. Social L/S goals were mainly involved for special economic factors. The increased financial ties with West Germany had become more important as GDR consumers were required to experience austere measures in order for the GDR to address the foreign debt problem, raw material shortages, high prices, and energy difficulties. However, "damage limitation" was also popular with the East German masses. This support was a potential domestic source of legitimacy in the face of slowing rises in consumer standards of living; to many East Germans, Honecker appeared as a leader who was doing his best for his country.

"Damage limitation" served to preserve those factors which had brought benefits to the SED regime because of the legitimizing and stabilizing nature of the existing relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. To risk past progress toward attainment of the legitimacy/stability goals ran absolutely counter to the perceived national interests of the GDR, and subsequently, motivated the resistance exhibited by the SED regime vis-a-vis Moscow.

7. SDI: The New Issue?

As Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the post of CPSU leader in March 1985, East Germany hoped that some degree of Soviet leadership stability would now take hold and clear the ambiguity of policy toward Eastern Europe. The SED predicted Gorbachev would "... restore energetic leadership . . . and end the confusion that overshadowed relations between Moscow and its key ally last year."⁹⁴ Even at Chernenko's funeral, Honecker continued pursuit of normal inter-German relations as he and Helmut Kohl met for two hours in a guest house producing a joint communique supporting improved East-West relations. But within ten days, another change from pro-Western rhetoric was evident in a joint communique from East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.⁹⁵ This new restraint was directly related to the Soviet perception of possible

⁹⁴Reuter Dispatch from East Berlin, March 12, 1985, which reported comments of SED officials to Western diplomats exhibiting encouragement over the appointment of Gorbachev; as quoted in Vladimir V. Kusin's article, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* (January-February 1986), p. 47.

⁹⁵*Izvestiya* (Moscow), March 21, 1985.

West German participation in the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Although the Soviets encouraged Honecker to remain friendly with other Western countries, upper level relations with Bonn were to be downplayed for the present, at least until the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. It appeared that a new issue had come to take the place of INF, and the same legitimacy/stability goals were undoubtedly at play. In the future, discord of a higher level between Bonn and Moscow is again possible, especially if SDI moves further along in research and development and closer to deployment (with West German help). As of this writing, there are new plans for Erich Honecker to visit the FRG. Whether or not the national interests of the East Germans manifested in the L/S goals discussed in this chapter will again produce frictions in Soviet-GDR relations is yet to be seen, but rest assured, inter-German relations will indeed continue to be involved.

B. GDR-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS

1. East Germany's Role in Eastern Europe

Not only must the GDR exist within a foreign policy environment created, for the most part, by its relationship with the Soviet Union, it must also interact with the other countries of the Soviet sphere -- the six countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Tied to these nations through common factors (e.g., Soviet power, military commitments, Marxism/Leninism, COMECON, geography, economic realities), East Germany has become one of the most influential nations within the "community of socialist states." However, as it continues its quest for legitimacy and stability, interaction with these countries has not always been cordial; often, differences have arisen and thinly veiled hostility has periodically become evident.

In discussing GDR relations with her "sister" nations behind the Iron Curtain, it is helpful to outline the importance of these countries to the Soviet Union, because the GDR aids in attaining Soviet goals in the region. John Van Oudenaren notes three types of East European contributions to the Soviets:⁹⁶

- 1) *Political*- The Soviet bloc nations (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania) provide a source of political power by allowing the Soviet Union to claim leadership of the international socialist movement. This role aids in the international prestige of the USSR, portraying it as a political world leader.

⁹⁶John Van Oudenaren, *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Options for the 1980's and Beyond* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, March 1984), p. v.

- 2) *Active*- Eastern Europe is a ready source of technology, scientific knowledge, military resources, economic resources, and diplomatic power for the Soviets.
- 3) *Passive*- The Warsaw Pact nations serve to insulate the Soviet Union from the West and, if required, enable military operations to take place from non-Soviet territories (important from the historical Russian legacy and paranoid mindset).

As the most loyal and helpful ally to the Soviet Union, the GDR has become increasingly important as a source of leverage within Eastern Europe to help in maintaining returns on Soviet investments.

First, East Germany:

... plays a central role in the ideological aspects of Moscow's *Blokpolitik* and its ideological significance for the USSR has increased since the 1970's The SED reinforces the legitimacy of the Soviet system as one of the staunchest supporters (together with Bulgaria) of Soviet ideological pronouncements except at the end of the Ulbricht regime. It therefore performs an important function in showing the correctness both of the domestic Soviet system and of its ideological claim to be the leading model for all its socialist allies.⁹⁷

Second, East Germany participates in Eastern Europe as a member of the "common defense" and functions in overall Warsaw Pact military planning. The National People's Army (NVA) is one of the best equipped and trained of all of the WTO nations; again, underscoring the role of East Germany as a significant junior partner of the USSR.⁹⁸ The military nature of the WTO serves two functions (related to the above three contributions). Robert Hutchings notes:

Somewhat paradoxically, the WTO's chief uses are political rather than purely military: it provides a forum for foreign policy coordination and the announcement of joint policy initiatives, and its vast apparatus serves as an instrument for maintaining the stability and cohesion of the Soviet bloc.⁹⁹

⁹⁷Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the German Democratic Republic," in *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, ed. S.M. Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 43.

⁹⁸In the late 1970's when the Soviets were increasing pressure on the East European nations to increase defense spending, the GDR increased hers more than any other member. For example, East German per capita military expenditures grew from \$427 (constant 1982 dollars) in 1973 to \$563 in 1983, an increase of over 31% and the largest in the Warsaw Pact. The nation with the next largest increase was Bulgaria (\$385 to \$461; an increase of 19.7%). See *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, August, 1985), Table I, pp. 55-78.

⁹⁹Robert L. Hutchings, "The Entangling Alliance: The Warsaw Pact on its Twenty-fifth Anniversary," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Background Report 108, 8 May 1980), p. 1; quoted in William Reisinger, "East European Military Expenditures in the 1970's: Collective Good or Bargaining Offer?" *International Organization*, Volume 37, no. 1 (Winter 1983), p. 150.

Third, the economic position of the GDR in the communist bloc creates no little influence vis-a-vis the other COMECON members. East Germany and the Soviet Union are the most important trading partners to each other (40% of total GDR trade in the 1980's). Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary are, respectively, East Germany's third, fourth, and fifth most important economic clients; accounting for over one-fourth of the total East German trade.¹⁰⁰ Bulgaria, Romania, and Cuba add another 5 percent.¹⁰¹ The economic relations with her Eastern neighbors also bring political benefits to the GDR:

Indeed, the economic development of the GDR is closely related to its development as a "junior partner" of the Soviets. This relationship has enhanced the GDR's prestige in Eastern Europe.¹⁰²

Lastly, the location of the GDR on the "front line" of communism provides both strategic importance for the pact as well as influence through its ability to interact with the West (both economically and politically).

Thus, for political-ideological, military, economic, and geographic reasons, the GDR is a key element in the plans and policies of the Soviet bloc, serving both Soviet and East German national interests:

Leading party officials of both the CPSU and the SED seem to view monolithic bloc unity as indispensable. The USSR sees the universal acceptance of its own leading role at stake. The East Germans, on the other hand, regard the solidarity of the Eastern camp as essential to compensate for their exposed and, in comparison with the Federal Republic, inferior position.¹⁰³

The SED's influence in Eastern Europe has been seen only rarely as autonomous policy; that is, autonomous vis-a-vis the USSR. These actions have mirrored legitimacy and stability concerns. To demonstrate that L S goals function in East German foreign policymaking for Eastern Europe, I will concentrate on two major crises in the Soviet bloc: the Czechoslovakian situation leading to the

¹⁰⁰The second major trading partner is the FRG.

¹⁰¹C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in Eastern Europe*, p. 177.

¹⁰²Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "The German Democratic Republic," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Communism in Eastern Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 155-156.

¹⁰³Gerhard Wettig, *Community and Conflict In the Socialist Camp* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 136.

Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968 and the Polish crisis of 1980-81. These two cases will be examined in the context of the legitimacy/stability matrix in order to verify that legitimacy and stability goals did indeed act as policy determinants.

2. Czechoslovakia- 1968

In January 1968 first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS), Antonin Novotny, was replaced by Alexander Dubcek, beginning what was to be called the "Prague Spring." Promising liberalization and democratization of society, Novotny introduced modest reforms while pledging loyalty to the USSR. Political life soon awakened again in Czechoslovakia where communist and non-communist alike participated in the public debate over continued reforms within Czech society.

The impact of this domestic upheaval upon Prague's foreign policy became evident in February 1968 in Budapest where a communist consultative meeting was held. This meeting revealed evidence of bloc disunity when the "hard-liners" (Soviets, East Germans, and Poles) issued statements supporting the creation of legal, binding documents to suppress the increasing nationalist tendencies in the socialist camp. In addition, these nations denounced the People's Republic of China for socialist deviation.¹⁰⁴ As a result of disagreement over this line of discussion, and criticism from the Syrian delegate over her internal policies, Romania walked out of the meeting on 29 February.¹⁰⁵ Czechoslovakia openly supported these Romanian positions -- a complete turn-around from the strict adherence to bloc policy during the latest Middle East war in 1967. But more importantly, the Czechs supported certain West German positions on *Ostpolitik*, contributing to East German rhetoric which blamed the FRG for "capitalist intervention" in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs.

Liberalism in Czechoslovakia spread rapidly throughout the society, thereby threatening the entire communist system. In March, Novotny was forced to relinquish his remaining political office as head of state. Public expression of non-communist

¹⁰⁴This was a tactic introduced by Honecker in line with his belief that the CPSU was the only true leader of world communism; see Heinz Lippman, *Honecker and the New Politics of Europe* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), p. 205.

¹⁰⁵Romania had increasingly become the maverick in the Soviet bloc since the removal of Soviet troops in the 1950's. By the late 1960's, and after the Sino-Soviet split, the Romanians possessed close ties with the PRC while, at the same time, they limited cooperation with the other communist states in Eastern Europe. The Romanians reduced their military contributions and prevented both exercises and troop movements on their territory by Warsaw Pact forces. They were not invited to important meetings such as those where military intervention could be discussed. Therefore, any support by the Czechs for the Romanian position was an act of "disloyalty" and, consequently, disconcerting to the Soviets.

opinions increased throughout March and spread into Poland where students and intellectuals cooperated in public demonstrations.¹⁰⁶ In response, on March 23 a Warsaw Pact meeting was held in Dresden. In the course of the discussions Dubcek gave assurances to all of the members present (Romania had not been invited) that any reforms would not endanger Czechoslovakia's road to socialism. The Dresden meeting was believed to be called at the insistence of Poland and the GDR:

This preference for a multilateral approach in dealing with Czechoslovakia could be assumed to reflect the serious concern of Ulbricht and Gomulka, particularly in view of moves in Czechoslovakia, beginning in mid-March, to end press censorship.¹⁰⁷

Lifting of the media ban significantly enhanced the role of the press, television, and radio as they became "tools for democratization." The SED became even more concerned, to say the least, as the GDR now was faced with dangerous broadcasts from two bordering countries (Czechoslovakia and West Germany). Increasingly severe criticism of the Soviet style of communism came to be commonplace in the Czechoslovakian press.

The German Question became important almost from the outset of the "Prague Spring" as the SED and the other Warsaw Pact countries placed blame for any counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia squarely on the West Germans. Similarly, East Germany stepped up its attacks on Czechoslovakia for any semblance of pro-Western orientation. Even after the communique issued during the Dresden meeting (which had expressed bloc confidence in the Czechoslovak proletariat's ability to protect socialism), the East Germans continued criticism.¹⁰⁸ In response, the Czechs issued official protests to the East German government, especially emphasizing that the SED should not possess a monopoly on policy with Bonn. East Germany by this time had already taken unilateral actions by halting East German tourist trips to Czechoslovakia and cancelling Czech-German newspaper subscriptions.¹⁰⁹ East Germany's fear of liberalization in any form gradually manifested itself in her foreign policy.

¹⁰⁶Jeffrey Simon, *Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 43.

¹⁰⁷Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance*, p. 76.

¹⁰⁸See complete text in R.A. Remington, *Winter in Prague* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 55-57.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 75.

The publication of the summary of the Czechoslovak "Action Program" on 5 April added fuel to the fire as new challenges to the communist status quo in Eastern Europe became apparent. Titled *Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism*, it called for greater autonomy in military and foreign affairs arenas, increased civil and personal freedoms, and greater inclusion of non-communist entities in governmental affairs.¹¹⁰

At the beginning of May, Dubcek flew to Moscow for high level discussions over both the reform situation and Czech requests for Soviet financial loans. At the conclusion of this meeting, other WTO members, this time excluding both Czechoslovakia and Romania, converged on Moscow. From this time on (after 11 May) an escalatory press campaign against Czechoslovakia was unleashed by the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland. East Germany ranted over the Berlin issue and accused West Germans and Americans of smuggling troops into Czechoslovakia. It was in May, also, that a secret memorandum had been circulated within the SED calling for armed intervention.¹¹¹

After on-again, off-again criticism from the Warsaw Pact media, the famous "2000 words manifesto" was published on June 27 in a Czech newspaper calling for even greater reform and signed by 70 prominent citizens. Soviet and East German suspicions increased dramatically as a result.

In July another multilateral conference convened in Warsaw where Ulbricht was also instrumental in issuing an ultimatum to Dubcek in the "Warsaw Letter."¹¹² The Czechs themselves were blamed for the counterrevolutionary tendencies in their country and were compared to leaders in Hungary in 1956. Clearly, this was a warning to Dubcek. By 1 August, however, in a meeting at Cierna nad Tisou on the Soviet-Czech border, an agreement was reached with the Soviets and ratified at Bratislava on 3 August by the six involved members of the WTO. It seemed for the time-being that the crisis had subsided.

The event which apparently pushed the Soviets to invade occurred on 10 August when the Czechoslovak draft party statutes were published. If adopted in September by the upcoming CPCS Party Congress, the sacrosanct principle of

¹¹⁰Jeffrey Simon, *Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe*, p. 43.

¹¹¹See F. Fejto, "Moscow and Its Allies," *Problems of Communism* (November-December 1968), p. 36.

¹¹²Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 55.

democratic centralism was to be discarded. Before this could occur, the Warsaw Pact invaded on 20 August with East German troops actively involved (the first and only time East German soldiers have been used outside of the GDR in bona fide military operations).¹¹³ Edwina Moreton notably discusses the East German pressures on the Soviets which contributed to this final invasion:

The decision to invade was the final outcome of a series of pressures on the Soviet leaders. Their immediate concern, however, was to preserve the leading role of a Moscow-oriented communist party within Czechoslovakia. This had been clearly expressed in the Warsaw ultimatum to Dubcek, and corresponded, too, to the interests of Poland and East Germany. This concern over domestic developments was obviously also linked with concern for the possible spill-over effect of the reform movement both within the Soviet Union and within other East European States, particularly Poland. The two principal factors influencing the Soviet assessment of the situation appeared to be the freedom of debate following the *de facto* abolition of censorship and proposal to modify the principle of democratic centralism.¹¹⁴

The actual influence of Ulbricht on the final Soviet decision to invade was greater than any other Soviet ally; however, the total impact of his stance was probably limited. More importantly, his urgings contributed to the "interventionist" faction in the Soviet policymaking arena.¹¹⁵ David Childs summarizes Ulbricht's concerns:

There was speculation at the time that Walter Ulbricht had played a major role in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. He certainly saw the "Prague Spring" as a threat to himself and possibly the SED. Even before Dubcek took over, the SED had had its eye on "revisionist circles" in Prague. About half a million East Germans went for their holidays in Czechoslovakia in 1968; the fear was that they would be infected by the Prague virus. Certainly Ulbricht could talk to the Moscow leaders as one who had a wealth of experience in the Communist movement and as the head of an important member of the Warsaw Pact. But Moscow knew of Ulbricht's weaknesses as well as his strengths and it is unlikely, therefore, that his opinion was decisive.¹¹⁶

¹¹³Although there were only two East German divisions engaged in rural areas, their use proved to the world that the NVA could (and was willing to) be used effectively in a foreign country.

¹¹⁴Edwina Moreton, *East Germany and the Warsaw Alliance*, pp. 78-79.

¹¹⁵For an excellent discussion of the decisionmaking process resulting in the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Valenta, *Anatomy of a Decision*.

¹¹⁶David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally* (London: George Allin and Unwin, 1983), p. 79.

According to Jiri Valenta, Ulbricht may have believed that a military intervention could delay or stop a Soviet-West German rapprochement which became evident in Brandt's *Ostpolitik* of the mid-1960's.¹¹⁷

Whether or not Ulbricht and the SED influenced the Soviets to intervene in Czechoslovakia is not as important as the hostile nature of their foreign policy posture vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia and the West. The future stability and legitimacy of the regime seemed to be precariously linked with the Czech system -- a system which recently had been so similar to that in the GDR.

Again, the East German attitudes toward the situation leading up to the Soviet invasion can also be explained through legitimacy/stability goals. (see Figure 4.4):

1. National identity goals were influential in motivating East German policies toward Czechoslovakia. The appearance of Czechoslovakia's preference for greater liberalization and hence closer ties with the West in general, and the FRG in particular, could only place doubts into the minds of East German citizens about the nature of the East German "nation." Access to Western media enabled the average East German to view a similar communist country struggling to become increasingly Western in its attitude -- an attitude which grew ever closer to West German values and which, therefore, created the perception that the German nation in the West might be the most credible of the two. After all, if the Czechs who had been such loyal socialists were now turning to the West Germans to aid in solving their problems, how could Germans in the GDR ignore the other *Deutschland*?
2. Sovereignty goals motivated East German actions mainly through the perceived danger that West Germany could undermine the GDR's position as the recognized German state in the Soviet bloc. At this time, Eastern Europe was the only international environment in which the GDR was regarded legally and diplomatically as a true nation-state. Any appearance of East German influence in the final policies undertaken in Czechoslovakia served to demonstrate that the GDR was a nation which could affect the politics of the powerful Warsaw Pact. One way to attain this was to appear even more reactionary than the Soviets in the hope that *East German* opinions would be evident in ultimate pact policy (apart from the real concerns the SED had for the spreading liberalism). At the same time, any permanent reform in Czechoslovakia could bring a leadership to power that would be more sympathetic to Bonn, further isolating the GDR in the world and confirming the overall international view that West Germany was the only credible German state.
3. Dangers to ideological goals were probably one of the paramount concerns of Ulbricht and the other SED leadership. East Germans could see from Czech and West German media that Marxism-Leninism was failing in a fraternal socialist state. This could set a very dangerous precedent, especially since the legitimacy problems of the GDR regime existed at two levels: the government *and* the state (unlike Czechoslovakia which was confronted with an illegitimate government only). The contagion of the reforms evident in the "Prague Spring" was perhaps the greatest threat to the East German regime, providing the major impetus for Ulbricht's interventionist pleadings. This danger was made even more credible with the Polish unrest in March 1968. The traditionally paranoid

¹¹⁷Jiri Valenta, *Anatomy*, p. 25.

| L/S GOALS* | HIGH | LOW |
|--------------------------|------|-----|
| <i>National Identity</i> | X | |
| <i>Sovereignty</i> | X | |
| <i>Ideology</i> | X | |
| <i>Social Policy</i> | X | |

**Legitimacy/Stability (L/S) Motivations
In GDR Foreign Policy*

1. *National Identity Goals* include those goals which, if attained, would contribute to the overall perception of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the East German "nation."

2. *Sovereignty goals* motivate policies which tend to illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and hence sovereignty.

3. *Ideology goals* are met by advocating the inherent "rightness" of the East German social and political system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration and limited contact would serve to protect ideological foundations.

4. *Social goals* encompass all those policies which are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.

Figure 4.4 East German Motivations in Czechoslovakia: 1968.

SED could not tolerate the thought of a successful democratization of a socialist neighbor; the result could most assuredly become a counterrevolutionary epidemic destabilizing the teetering level of legitimacy for the SED.

4. Social policy was also affected because of the loss of trade that could occur if Czechoslovakia turned to the West for her economic health. As mentioned before, Czechoslovakia was the third largest trading partner for East Germany, but more importantly, this trade exceeded the total trade with all other non-Soviet COMECON countries.¹¹⁸ In addition, closer Czech ties with the FRG as a result of the liberal policies could possibly take away from GDR trade with Bonn. These inter-bloc and extra-bloc economic possibilities could negatively affect the East German economy, consumer satisfaction, and hence domestic legitimacy and stability.

Given these concerns by the SED leadership, it seems extremely plausible that Ulbricht would apply considerable pressure upon the Soviets to militarily intervene in Czechoslovakia to reestablish the former state of affairs to protect the communist *status quo* in Eastern Europe.

3. Poland 1980-81

In the summer of 1980, it became evident that the economic policies of Edward Gierek, the head of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), and his toleration for political dissent combined to endanger the stability of the Polish government. However, the Soviet leadership considered Gierek an old and trusted leader. They tended to do anything possible to keep him in power, even after warnings from the Soviet ambassador to Poland and other internal sources reported a very unstable situation. There had been periodic strikes in July because of the rise in meat and meat-product prices, and in August, a giant sit-down strike occurred at the Lenin shipyards at Gdansk, the site of a violent confrontation in the workers' riots of 1970.¹¹⁹ Over the next few weeks and months, workers, students, and intellectuals united in demanding genuine trade unions, the right to strike, higher wages, lower staple prices, and other economic concessions from the government. From this initial unrest, the demands grew to include a general liberalization of the regime including the lifting of press censorship, increased civil liberties, and the release of political prisoners

¹¹⁸Peter Ludz, *The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies* (New York: AMS Press, 1970), p. 73.

¹¹⁹The 1970 riots were also triggered by increased prices of meat (as well as vodka) and served to topple the Polish leadership under Wladyslaw Gomulka. Andrzej Korbonski argues that "... the overthrow of Gomulka in December 1970 represented not only a crisis of legitimacy and penetration but also a crisis of participation, and that in this respect it illustrated rather well the notion of mass politicization leading to social frustration and political instability because of the absence of channels for meaningful participation." See Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland", in *Communism in Eastern Europe*, edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 55.

(as in Czechoslovakia-1968). By September, many of these requests had been addressed, or at least acted upon in a positive way.

The new free labor trade union, Solidarity, soon became the leading voice in the battle for liberalization and encompassed over nine million members within the following months, while the communist party and trade unions lost membership.¹²⁰ Protests and work stoppages continued in the wake of the government concessions and Gierek was himself dismissed in September. His successor, Stanislaw Kania, was faced with an economic reform movement which now possessed a political momentum. This in itself could easily cause a repeat performance of the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968. However, because of the size of the Polish population, the historical legacy of Polish armed resistance, and the economic costs of a possible Soviet occupation of the country (especially in the wake of the Afghanistan imbroglio), Soviet intervention was unlikely if any possibility of a peaceful solution to the situation remained (but Soviet intentions were not readily apparent to the West at this time). Throughout the rest of the year, Kania was faced with growing hostility from the Kremlin, through the press and diplomatic pressure behind the scenes. In addition, the Soviets increased military activity near Poland's borders. Kania found himself wedged between the Soviet Union and Solidarity.

East Germany's main response to the labor unrest in Poland in the fall of 1980 was a reassertion of control on the domestic front, a press campaign against Polish liberalism, and an increased demarcation (an emphasized return to *Abgrenzung*). Arthur Hanhardt noted in a contemporary article:

The events in neighboring Poland were weighty in the decision to pursue GDR demarcation policies with greater vigor. Elements of the "Polish disease" are present in the GDR: there are upward pressures on domestic prices held artificially low by SED policy, along with internal dissent and dissatisfaction. Moreover, the SED is in the position of having to worry about two "fronts." The dangers from Western influence are compounded by possible infection from the Polish East.¹²¹

¹²⁰Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations* (New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 279.

¹²¹Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "The Germans and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War?" *Current History* (April 1981), pp. 148, 179.

The strikes and demonstrations in July and August were initially ignored in the East German press; the media were not sure how to tactically express the situation in Poland when the citizenry could see or hear the events on Western news programs. Also, since it was not ideologically possible to have strikes in socialist countries, there developed another dilemma in the attempt to explain the Polish situation. Not until August 27 did the East Germans provide any news to its population, which appeared as a reprint of a Tass article in *Neues Deutschland*. This article accused foreign interventionists for the Polish dilemma, somewhat similar to the rhetoric during the "Prague Spring."

The ouster of Gierek under implications of high level corruption, combined with Western hints of similar circumstances in the GDR leadership, threatened the image of the SED and, more importantly, increased the paranoia in the Party. Polish demands for independent labor unions were countered by the East German regime as anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary because the Solidarity movement was a direct threat to SED labor unions and hence the regime. Not surprisingly, the East German government sided with the Soviets.

Internal control of the population was tightened:

EAST BERLIN, Oct. 28: East Germany today announced severe restrictions on travel to and from Poland in a move that followed this country's cutback of communications with West Germany and virtually sealed 17 million East Germans off from their neighbors to both East and West.¹²²

Just two weeks prior to this crackdown on travel to the east, the GDR had drastically raised the amount of currency that Western visitors to the GDR were required to exchange. Customs controls were also tightened along the Polish-GDR border to further discourage Polish travel to East Germany and vice versa. In November, rail traffic between the two countries was curtailed following East German press attacks on Lech Walesa, the Polish labor leader.¹²³ Thus, the conflagration sweeping Poland reemphasized the SED's traditional problems: the absence of legitimacy at home as highlighted by events abroad in a similar socialist system. After all, East Germany had

¹²²"East Germany to Limit Travel Across Polish Borders," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1980, p. A11.

¹²³"East Germans Curtail Rail Traffic to Poland and Demand Loyalty," *The New York Times*, November 27, 1980, p. 11.

a difficult enough time limiting the liberalizing influences from the West without worrying about threats from the socialist "family."

In other actions, the SED publicly echoed the Soviet line of criticism in regards to Poland and exploited domestic anti-Polish prejudices to camouflage the cost of possible losses in raw material and economic aid. The latter could occur if the Soviets were forced to bolster the Polish economy.¹²⁴ These prejudices were indeed real as evidenced by the relief many East German citizens exhibited after the travel restrictions were issued -- relief resulting from resentment over shopping sprees by Polish tourists in East German stores (which had become commonplace before the labor strikes at Gdansk).¹²⁵ Although these prejudices were on the SED's side, the regime continued to display concern over the events in Poland.

In December, East Germany made threatening moves on the border with Poland by restricting troops to garrisons and towns, cancelling leaves, and introducing alert conditions.¹²⁶ As the tension in Poland continued into the new year, East Germany began issuing large numbers of exit permits to unwanted individuals:

It sent home some 22,000 Polish guest workers employed in East Germany, including one group of technicians who, it was reported, had attempted to establish a branch of Solidarity.¹²⁷

Polish artists seen with Solidarity badges were expelled and increased measures were taken against any type of anti-socialist behavior or counterrevolutionary activity. This illustrated the fears of the SED that potential unrest in the GDR was never far under the surface, even in the midst of traditional biases against the Poles.

In February 1981, Kania met with Honecker in East Berlin where agreements of "fundamental and far-reaching significance" were supposedly concluded. Honecker reiterated "solidarity with the Polish comrades in their striving to strengthen socialism

¹²⁴East Germany also suffered from the falling Polish coal production and declining Polish exports resulting from the strikes.

¹²⁵Michael MacQueen, "Polish-East German Tourism: A Thwarted End to a Hopeful Experiment," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Background Report 169, 11 July 1980).

¹²⁶"East Germany Restricting Troops," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1980, p. 14.

¹²⁷Jan B. Weydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, and Kevin Devlin, *The Polish Drama: 1980-1982* (Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 157.

and the party in order to bring the country out of the crisis-ridden situation."¹²⁸ For the next few months the SED railed against counterrevolutionary forces in Poland as Solidarity continued to build support. A *Der Spiegel* report in April reported:

The SED leadership as before suggests hard action to end the crisis in Poland. Party chief Erich Honecker said in February: "The experience of the GDR with counterrevolutionaries shows that one must act not merely politically but also militarily." . . . At the Moscow summit meeting of the East bloc on 5 December 1980 Honecker had suggested a quick Soviet intervention in Poland. The chairman of the GDR State Council made another attempt in late March to prompt the Polish Communist Party leadership to take action.¹²⁹

The most serious reaction to the Polish crisis in 1981 was the series of military preparations begun in September: mobilization of reserves and militia (*Kampfgruppen*), concentration of railway resources for troop transport, and establishment of possible new units. This must have placed greater pressure on the Kania government to stop the further erosion of the authority of the party.

Therefore, by the time martial law was imposed in Poland during December 1981, the GDR had undertaken a series of steps to reduce the spread of the "Polish Virus" into East Germany since August 1980. These are summarized below:

1. Initial silence was maintained to coordinate and develop a media strategy vis-a-vis information from the West.
2. Blame was then placed on "foreign interventionists" as the cause of the anti-socialist events occurring in Poland.
3. The policy of demarcation (*Abgrenzung*) was reemphasized through reformed currency requirements used to reduce contacts from West Germany.
4. Travel restrictions, curtailment of rail traffic, and customs controls were implemented on the Polish border to limit "infection" from the East.
5. Press attacks were stepped up against Lech Walesa and the Solidarity movement to discredit them as unpatriotic and troublemakers duped by capitalist forces.
6. The historical anti-Polish biases of the East German people were exploited to limit what liberal ideas might reach the population. This tended to brand any anti-socialist behavior as manifested in Poland as Polish, not East German, and therefore undesirable.
7. In December 1980, troops were restricted to garrisons which served to intimidate the Kania regime.
8. Large numbers of Polish citizens, artists, and visitors in the GDR were deported or persuaded to leave in order to reduce their contact with East German citizens.

¹²⁸*Neues Deutschland*, 22 February 1981, p. 2, in *FBIS* (Eastern Europe), 25 February 1981, p. E 3.

¹²⁹*Der Spiegel*, 13 April 1981, p. 14, in *FBIS* (Eastern Europe), 13 April 1981.

9. Internal suppression of any signs of dissent and counterrevolutionary activity was stepped up.
10. An ideology of "social harmony" was propagated by courting the SED party affiliated trade unions and increased non-SED party activities. This was used to "move the people closer" to the state and prove to the average East German that his interests were being looked after.¹³⁰
11. Lastly, in the months before the declaration of martial law, hints of military action as seen in the extensive preparations in September 1981 placed further pressure on the Kania regime to solve its problems.

Figure 4.5 illustrates the L/S goals which were active in the East German reactions to the Polish crisis. These motivations seem to be very similar to those at work in the Czechoslovakian crisis twelve years earlier:

1. National identity goals were important in determining East German actions toward Poland. As in Czechoslovakia, Western media were showing information sooner than East German media. Consequently, another socialist ally was portrayed as moving closer to the West. This discredited East Germany vis-a-vis the FRG. In response, the return to *Abgrenzung* served to reemphasize differences between the two Germanies in addition to insulating the public from liberal ideas. Unofficial concentration on the theme of Polish inferiority indicated the superior nature of East Germany, underscoring a sense of pride in being a GDR citizen.
2. There was little or no pressure placed upon the Soviet leadership to militarily intervene in Poland (at least of the same level as 1968). However, East German actions seemed to be derived from concerns for possible damage to GDR sovereignty. These policies were seen in SED statements accusing the West of intervening in Polish internal affairs, stressing the "rightness" of socialism (the GDR) by discrediting capitalism (the FRG). All actions appeared to be independent, therefore maintaining, and possibly enhancing, East German autonomy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
3. Motivation of policy due to pursuit of ideological goals was probably the most important factor in this crisis. Again, Marxism-Leninism seemed to be faltering in a similar socialist country. The "Polish Virus" was a local danger to the GDR regime whose attempts to insulate East German citizens were aimed at preventing the contagion from spreading. Events were occurring in Poland which, according to communist dogma, were not supposed to happen: strikes were commonplace and the central authority of the PZWP was disappearing. Most of the East German policies during the Polish crisis were in reaction to dangers threatening the ideological foundations of SED rule.
4. Social goals were not as important as in the Czechoslovak crisis. Although Poland was the fourth largest trading partner of East Germany, the other L/S goals seemed to take precedence. In fact, the apparent popular support for the closing of the border with Poland (which prevented Polish tourists from depleting relatively well-stocked stores in the GDR) would appear to have improved consumer welfare by eliminating a cause of shortages in certain areas. However, the loss of energy and raw materials would have balanced any positive gains in that respect, as did the West German currency requirements which cut down on the number of visitors from the West.¹³¹ Overall, social goals were not adversely affected nor did they go far in motivating East German actions relative to Poland.

¹³⁰ See *La Figaro*, 31 October 1981, p. 3, in *FBIS* (Eastern Europe), 4 November 1981, p. E 5.

¹³¹ West Germans were regular sources of Western gifts and hard currency for thousands of East Germans.

| L/S GOALS* | HIGH | LOW |
|--------------------------|------|-----|
| <i>National Identity</i> | X | |
| <i>Sovereignty</i> | X | |
| <i>Ideology</i> | X | |
| <i>Social Policy</i> | | X |

**Legitimacy/Stability (L/S) Motivations
In GDR Foreign Policy*

1. *National Identity Goals* include those goals which, if attained, would contribute to the overall perception of a separate East German national heritage and culture.
Policy Example: Policies aimed toward recognition of GDR citizenship would serve to lend credence to the East German "nation."

2. *Sovereignty goals* motivate policies which tend to illustrate the GDR as a new and viable nation in the international milieu.
Policy Example: The attempt to convincingly downplay Soviet penetration and control enhances GDR autonomy and hence sovereignty.

3. *Ideology goals* are met by advocating the inherent "rightness" of the East German social and political system.
Policy Example: The policy of controlled emigration and limited contact would serve to protect ideological foundations.

4. *Social goals* encompass all those policies which are aimed at maintaining popular support through economic growth, standard of living, welfare, etc.
Policy Example: official help in increasing reception of West German television broadcasts in the Eastern portions of the GDR illustrate social goal motivations.

Figure 4.5 The GDR and the Polish Crisis: 1980-81.

If this analysis holds true, then the matrix again indicates that East German foreign policy reactions to the Solidarity movement in Poland were indeed influenced by legitimacy and stability concerns. The temporary instability created when policies were implemented -- policies such as more restricted freedoms and movement of East German citizens -- were accomplished to maintain what gains in domestic legitimacy the SED had, to date, attained.

C. THE GDR IN THE THIRD WORLD

East Germany possesses extensive ties with a number of countries of the Third World. At times there have been over 22 individual states outside Europe considered East German clients -- clients such as Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, India, Syria, and Brazil. Other relationships in the Third World have included (or presently include) Namibia, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, and, possibly, Nicaragua. During the Grenada invasion in 1983, documents linking the SED with technical and military assistance in that nation were captured,¹³² and East German weapons, military advisors, and equipment have been recently reported in Kampuchea.¹³³

The GDR's presence in these countries is largely explained as a part of the "international division of labor" inherent in the Soviet bloc, and East Germany's actions have closely followed Soviet initiatives in this regard. Melvin Croan writes:

East German activities have been closely tailored to the needs of Soviet policy, of which they must be regarded an integral part. Indeed, the GDR's substantial presence on the African continent today would be all, but inconceivable without the Kremlin's prior approval, if not, explicit direction.¹³⁴

In the case of Third World involvement then, East German policies mirror Soviet policies. There are at least four reasons why the GDR adopts this Soviet position in the Third World:

¹³²Jiri Valenta and Herbert Ellison, chairmen, *Soviet-Cuban Strategy in the Third World After Grenada: Toward the Prevention of Future Grenadas* (Washington, D.C.: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, August 1984).

¹³³"Khmer Rebels Say East Germans Aid Vietnamese," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 March 1984, p. 2.

¹³⁴Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *The Washington Quarterly* 3 (Winter 1980), pp. 21-22.

1. This posture reinforces the importance of the SED to the Kremlin as a valuable ally, thus providing greater flexibility in other policymaking environments vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (i.e., inter-German relations, trade, and economic policies).
2. Third World involvement increases the international legitimacy (and hence domestic legitimacy) of the GDR.
3. These relations enable the GDR to compete with West German influence in the international arena, emphasizing East German national identity.
4. Lastly, these policies allow greater access to economic benefits since the Third World provides sources of raw materials and markets for East German goods, aiding in satisfying consumer demands in the GDR.

Therefore, the GDR is a willing participant in the developing world for reasons of its own, and legitimacy and stability influence these special interests.

After international recognition of the GDR in the early 1970's and the realization of the need to limit Western influence following detente, massive integration of foreign policies with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states occurred. This served to limit further sacrifices of SED interests in the pursuit of closer relations with the West:

With the partial reopening of the "national question," the SED sought psychological reassurance through renewed refuge in Moscow-centered "socialist internationalism," which had long served its ranking elite as a kind of ersatz patriotism.¹³⁵

At the same time, detente provided more flexibility for the SED in foreign policy because of the growth of official activities resulting from diplomatic recognition (thus aiding in the realization of closer contacts with the developing countries of the world). Therefore, as East Germany played the part of a Soviet proxy in the Third World, increased opportunities to satisfy its own legitimacy and stability needs also became apparent, providing another means to solidify SED control and prestige. Interactions with countries in South America, the Middle East, and especially Africa continue to enable the regime to gain some benefits in this regard.

1. Roles

East German roles in the Third World can be divided into four major areas: military, economic, ideological, and diplomatic. Militarily, the East Germans provide both equipment and personnel, and, in the case of Africa, are second only to Cuba in providing advisory and support troops to socialist-oriented regimes.¹³⁶ There are an

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 23.

estimated 2,500 to 4,500 military personnel operating in approximately a dozen countries with over 1500 in Africa alone -- a new "Red Afrika Korps" (see Table 3). In the early 1980's the GDR was spending an estimated \$20 million annually in military aid to the Third World.¹³⁷ The GDR has also built upon its reputation for efficiency in organizing and training security forces and has taken advantage of this to gain influence with leaders of emerging countries. This East German security expertise is utilized extensively in countries such as South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Libya. In other military assistance programs, East German cadres reportedly assisted troops in the Ethiopian civil war, and the NVA constructed military airfields in Tanzania; training facilities in India; provided trained communication personnel in Laos, Nigeria, Libya, and Angola; and trained guerrillas in Mozambique (and within the GDR itself). Some sources blame the East Germans for the invasion of Zaire's Shaba province in May 1978, which caused international excitement.¹³⁸

Economically, the GDR is interested in the Third world for rich sources of oil, raw materials, and markets for its growing consumer economy. It spends upwards of \$300 million annually in economic assistance in these developing countries to keep trade open. Sales of East German machinery, fertilizers, chemicals, and vehicles sometimes often produce a positive trade balance and provide sources of hard currency. Consequently, the SED leadership identifies potential trading partners based upon: (1) political stability of the particular government; (2) the client's need for production technology and transportation; (3) its existence as a strong source of food, raw materials, and other goods needed in the GDR; (4) its capability to absorb East German products; and (5) a demonstrated independence from the West.

Ideologically, the GDR trains party cadres, liberation groups, intelligence services, and secret police in these countries in order to further the "progress of socialism." By backing such groups as the MPLA, the PLO, or SWAPO, the regime can claim participation in the "liberation of the world from capitalism," thereby

¹³⁶Cited in "Honecker Cementing Aid and Technology Ties On 4-Nation Trip," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 22 February 1979, p. 6.

¹³⁷Angela Stent, "Soviet Policy Toward the GDR," p. 48.

¹³⁸"East Germany: Fronting For Moscow in Africa," *Business Week*, 24 July 1978, pp. 64-65.

TABLE III
EAST GERMAN MILITARY IN THE THIRD WORLD

| COUNTRY | 79-80 | 81-82 | 82-83 | 83-84 | 84-85 | 85-86 |
|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Angola | 1500 | 800 | 450 | 450 | 500 | 500 |
| Ethiopia | - | R | 250 | 550 | 550 | 550 |
| PDRY | - | 100 | 325 | 75 | 75 | 75 |
| Mozambique | - | R | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Iraq | - | - | 160 | 160 | 160 | 160 |
| Libya | - | 1600 | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| Algeria | - | R | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |
| Guinea | - | - | 125 | 125 | 125 | 125 |
| Syria | - | R | 210 | 210 | 210 | 210 |
| Totals | 1500 | 2500 | 2270 | 2320 | 2370 | 2370 |

R= Reported, exact numbers unknown.

SOURCE:
The Military Balance 1985-1986 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986).

heralding the righteousness of the GDR over the "neo-colonialism and racism" of the FRG on an international level. As the most important region of East German influence:

Africa has come to be regarded as an exceptionally promising arena in which to pursue both East Germany's rivalry with West Germany and its "delimitation" from the FRG, toward the greater goal of fostering a better sense of the GDR's distinctive political identity within East Germany itself... The latter concern informs the GDR's presentation of itself to Africa and also figures centrally in domestic propaganda concerning the GDR's African engagement. Both seek to portray the GDR as the embodiment of a different, ¹³⁹better Germany that comes to Africa with unsullied hands and selfless motives.

¹³⁹Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" p. 33.

The Third World relationship provides yet another forum for SED claims to international legitimacy through diplomatic means. For instance, between 1977 and 1979 at least nine official visits by key East German leaders to African client states occurred. These diplomatic sojourns served to underscore the importance of the GDR in the developing world (from the perspective of the average East German). Taking advantage of traditional respect for Germans in these countries (especially in those areas historically affected by German efficiency), the SED actually seems to have surpassed West Germany in Third World influence in Africa. This also provides another tool to support SED claims as the inheritor of the German nation and German history.

2. Legitimacy/Stability Motivations

The roles discussed above mirror the legitimacy/stability concerns of the SED regime and foster policies in the Third World which address these. Motivations are summarized below (see Figure 4.6):

1. National identity goals are served by greater involvement in Third World countries because of the increased opportunities to outperform the West Germans in assisting in the development of these nations. In addition, East Germany can claim continuity as the "real" Germany by utilizing historical German influence in these regions to demonstrate an East German national identity.
2. Sovereignty goals are pursued through the increased sense of international legitimacy which, in turn, influences domestic legitimacy in the GDR. The emphasis placed upon the diplomatic exchanges and travel of high level officials to these countries raises SED prestige in the eyes of its subjects. Sovereignty is expanded and East Germans can take pride in the international missions of the GDR.
3. Ideological motivations are again a result of the SED's political inferiority complex. The East German activity in the Third World points toward the "fulfillment of a universal historical mission of chiliastic proportions."¹⁴⁰ Any East German successes in the Third World can only result in increased credibility for Marxism-Leninism and hence the SED regime.
4. Lastly, economic considerations add impetus to East German moves in other parts of the world. The needs for raw materials, oil, new markets, and hard currency (especially in the wake of price rises and shortages from Soviet sources) must be influential in any cost/benefit analysis carried out by the regime. New avenues to satisfy the growing demands of the East German consumer are evident in the developing world. Ironically, the GDR has shown itself to be the real inheritor of the old German colonialism (rather than the FRG) as it seeks new markets to exploit outside the Soviet bloc in order to attain social policy goals.

The matrix once again identifies all four L/S goals as factors in continued GDR contacts in the Third World. Although East German policies are closely connected to Soviet goals in this arena, the national interests of both countries seem to

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 34.

| L/S GOALS* | HIGH | LOW |
|--------------------------|------|-----|
| <i>National Identity</i> | X | |
| <i>Sovereignty</i> | X | |
| <i>Ideology</i> | X | |
| <i>Social Policy</i> | X | |

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Figure 4.6 GDR L/S Motivations in the Third World.

run parallel. As long as these relations provide the SED with the benefits discussed above, East German activity will continue in the developing world as another means to build and maintain domestic legitimacy and stability.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

These six analyses of East German foreign policy demonstrate the importance of legitimacy and stability concerns in overall foreign policy formulation by the SED leadership. Although ultimately controlled by the Soviet Union, the GDR has acted in its own national interests; more than once conflicting with those of the USSR.

The conflicts over detente, the policy of *Abgrenzung*, and "Damage Limitation" (as seen through the L/S perspective) all provide possible understanding for the Soviet-GDR-West German relationship as it exists even today. The actions taken by the SED in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1980-81 also illustrate the importance of legitimacy /stability goals when closely examined. Lastly, East German involvement in the Third World proves to be another means with which to reduce the chronic paranoia of the regime and continue the unending quest for acceptance by its people.

V. AMERICAN POLICIES AND THE GDR

A. INTRODUCTION

Given the nature of legitimacy and stability as a determinant of both domestic and foreign policies of the SED regime, how does this relationship influence American policy in the region? To answer this question, this chapter addresses American policies in Germany (both East and West Germany). The national interest of the United States as it applies to the GDR is analyzed in terms of its nature as well as its relationship to the maintenance of East German legitimacy and stability goals.¹⁴¹

First, past American policies in Germany are discussed with emphasis on the post-World War II period of the Cold War and the period of detente beginning in the late 1960's; second, the relationship of American interests to the attainment of L/S goals by the SED regime is portrayed and analyzed using a matrix derived from Donald Neuchterlein's book, *National Interest's and Presidential Leadership*.¹⁴² Lastly, future U.S. policy options vis-a-vis East Germany are explored.

B. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The mid to late 1940's were watershed years for East-West relations and the German question as it emerged after the defeat of the Third Reich. During World War II, the allies had determined to divide Germany into occupation zones for purposes of administration and military control after the war. In the immediate post-war period, there seemed to be five possible solutions to the German problem:¹⁴³

1. A so-called "Carthaginian Peace" was desired by broad segments of the populations of the victorious nations. This entailed outright annexation and permanent Allied control of German territories, drastic reparations and dismantlement, and multinational control of the industrial Ruhr. This option

¹⁴¹It must be emphasized that East Germany has acted as a "sub-set" of the larger East European/Soviet problem for the United States and, therefore, must be analyzed as such in this chapter. The unique nature of the GDR, as well as the consequent opportunities and constraints for the United States, are important -- however, important only as a part of the overall American effort in its international relations in the region.

¹⁴²Donald Neuchterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978).

¹⁴³From Klaus Epstein, "The Division of Germany," in *The Origins of the Cold War*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 123-125.

was predicated on continued cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Another drawback to this alternative was that it could never win the support of the German people.

2. A second alternative could occur if the United States once again pulled out of the international arena in a return to isolationism. The Soviet Union would be allowed full rein in Germany, and the natural, as well as human, resources of the late great power would become implements of the USSR.
3. Western domination of all of Germany was another possibility, but could only be attained in an aggressive campaign of Western military superiority to impose unfavorable terms upon the Russians. To attain this superiority however, there would have to occur total cooperation and commitment among the three major Western powers -- given the condition of post-war Europe, an event extremely unlikely to develop.
4. The fourth policy option in 1945 was the negotiation of a four-power agreement on a completely neutralized Germany, intact and progressing toward autonomy (as in the Austrian case in 1955). The growing hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as differences in civil, economic, and political administration in the respective zones, proved this solution to be unworkable.
5. The final alternative was the partition of Germany along zonal borders. To accomplish this, American policymakers realized that the western zones would have to be quickly rehabilitated and integrated into the Western European community.

Initially, American policies were undertaken to promote cooperation with the Soviets, reflecting a so-called "Left" view of solutions to the German problem (based upon the "Carthaginian peace" alternative).¹⁴⁴ These policies proved detrimental to American interests in Central Europe, however, since American and British zones were comprised of mainly industrial lands (and the French and Russians possessed agricultural regions), food was required to be imported while reparations were extracted for all Allies from these Anglo-American areas. In addition, Germany's war damage was so extensive that there was little industrial base from which to exact reparations without even greater destruction of the German economy. It rapidly became evident to the Americans that this spelled economic ruin for Germany and instability for all of Western Europe.

With this realization, American policy began to change. An important first step in the process leading to the division of Germany began in September 1946 when Secretary of State James Byrnes announced the creation of Bizonia (an economic fusion of the British and American zones). This reflected the increasing tensions with

¹⁴⁴The "Left" consisted of those who believed themselves to be carrying out the mission on which the United States had embarked in World War II. It targeted for elimination militarism, Junkerism, big capital, and, naturally, Nazism. Conversely, the "Right" desired to utilize Germany in the fight against Russia and communism.

the Soviets.¹⁴⁵ A relationship with the Russians had evolved where:

Too many differences separated the two sides for them to work together on a matter so centrally important as Germany; even when they used the same words, they could not understand each other. A division into two Germanys would be preferable to a struggle for the soul of a united Germany, a contest that might well end in a third world war.¹⁴⁶

Throughout the spring of 1947, continued Russian intransigence caused a virtual standstill in negotiations over Germany's fate and further aroused American suspicions over Soviet intentions in Europe. From then on the evolution of the West German state and its integration into the Western bloc became the sine qua non for American policies in Europe. Shortly thereafter the Truman Doctrine was announced and in June, the three western zones were invited into the Marshall Plan.¹⁴⁷ Then, in July, the famous Mr. X article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", was published in *Foreign Affairs*, creating in the process an international sensation.¹⁴⁸ All three of these important events outlined the beginning of an American policy of "containment" in regards to communism, and the future of Germany was inextricably linked to this foreign policy orientation.

¹⁴⁵This announcement came after a Council of Foreign Minister's meeting in Paris during April and in June and July 1946; where Secretary Byrnes proposed a twenty-five-year disarmament pact for Germany as a demonstration of Allied solidarity. The Soviets (Molotov) criticized the "inadequacy" of the plan and demanded the "democratization" of Germany (in the Soviet sense of the word). He also reiterated the demand for \$10 billion dollars in reparations and the creation of four-power control of the industrially rich Ruhr valley. This served to widen the rift between the two new superpowers. See Hans W. Gatzke, *Germany and the United States: A Special Relationship?* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 157-158.

¹⁴⁶Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), p. 230.

¹⁴⁷This plan was to aid in the recovery of Europe, and was motivated to keep communism from occurring in the war-ravaged territories by the infusion of American money. It embodied the essence of the Truman Doctrine (which had been triggered by events in Greece and Turkey). The Marshall plan also proved to be an immense success in both rebuilding the European economies and preventing instability in Western Europe (and hence opportunities for communism to take hold). One author stated, "The Marshall Plan had been a massive success, and at a cost that represented only a tiny fraction of the U.S. national income over the same four-year period and was smaller than America's liquor bill for these same years!" See John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, sixth edition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 53.

¹⁴⁸The author was actually George Kennan, the Foreign Service's foremost expert on the Soviet Union. The article spelled out the communist outlook of world affairs; defining Soviet interests in terms of the inevitable overthrow of the capitalist West, and identified the necessity for the United States to counter this hegemonic

Thus, the United States entered into a new era in its foreign policy. Although there appeared to be a tendency to return to the traditional isolationist posture of the past (massive demobilization after the war was a good indicator of this), Soviet intransigence, aggression, and actions in Eastern Europe began to affect both public and leadership attitudes toward the USSR. The Americans reluctantly recognized that they were now the leading nation in the world and, as the old colonial empires crumbled, the traditional European powers could no longer maintain the balance of power as before. The future of Germany emerged at the center of the struggle between the two new superpowers in the world, and by 1947 policymakers realized that the United States was faced with two overriding goals -- to counter Soviet subversion against a poverty-stricken and war-ravaged Europe and to restore some balance of power against the USSR (while satisfying France that Germany would not again threaten her).

From 1947 to 1949, events moved rapidly as both East and West consolidated their positions in Germany, and these years would prove to be the most decisive in the history of postwar Germany. The French became the target of American and British diplomacy to allay French fears of a revitalized Germany, and the February 1948 Czechoslovakian coup served as a further stimulus for Western Europeans and the Americans to begin seriously working on an acceptable formula for the Western zones to be merged into a trizonal arrangement (which occurred in 1949). Currency reforms were undertaken to spur economic recovery in these zones; the first international confrontation over Berlin occurred; NATO was created as a Western alliance with twelve signatories in April 1949; and in May, the constitution of the new Federal Republic of Germany was adopted at a time when elections were occurring in East Germany to establish the GDR.

By May 1949, the Americans had thus convinced the French that U.S. presence in Europe would prevent future German domination of the Alliance and the division of Germany had been rendered "permanent." In addition, NATO provided the means to begin the integration of West Germany into Western Europe to counter Soviet influence; a divided Germany in the Western sphere of influence was indeed better than a united Germany under the control of the USSR. The next few years were devoted to

power. Kennan had also authored the "Long Telegram" in 1946 as chief of mission in the American Embassy in Moscow, probably the most famous telegram sent within the Foreign Service. This telegram also explained the Soviet "outlook" of the world as an insecure nation.

preparing the FRG to take greater part in the Alliance and become a major player in Western Europe. .

During this period, American policy toward Germany, as has been briefly described here, was in large measure determined by Soviet actions; however, there were other interests involved as well. The United States had concerns for national security, the maintenance of free enterprise, and possible desires for economic gain in the rehabilitation of a free Germany and a viable and democratic Western Europe. All of these interests revolved around the support of a new Germany -- West Germany.

Subsequent U.S. policies toward the GDR during the 1950's were based upon containment of Communism and support for the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, a position of total non-recognition of East German sovereignty was embodied in America's participation in the Hallstein Doctrine.¹⁴⁹ The absence of East German legitimacy (as perceived by the United States) was reinforced by the Soviet interventions during the labor riots in June 1953 and the two Berlin crises (1948 and 1961).¹⁵⁰ In addition, the movement of hundreds of thousands of East German emigres to the West before the construction of the Berlin Wall illustrated the lack of indigenous support for the regime during this time.

Therefore, American policies were forced to consider the realities of the German situation in the areas of human rights, political freedom, and the totalitarian aspects of Marxism in the GDR. At the same time, however, the primary interest of the United States clearly entailed the maintenance of stability in Central Europe through preserving the balance of power/status quo and containing the Soviets. Consequently, support for the West German position was a major factor in *official* American positions on reunification, although a unified Germany might not have been a logical goal of U.S. policies.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹As mentioned earlier, this policy served to punish those countries which recognized or interacted in any positive way towards the GDR. See Chapter IV.

¹⁵⁰For an excellent analysis of the Berlin crises and related American policies, see Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

¹⁵¹Although U.S. policies, for obvious reasons, outwardly supported reunification, it is illogical to believe that American policymakers truly desired to bring back a destabilizing power such as a new and restored Germany under the current circumstances.

After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed open to East-West dialogue -- dialogue including the German question. By 1967, the United States perceived advantages in normalizing relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. First of all, and possibly most importantly, world tensions could be relaxed in an atmosphere of increased negotiations; detente could prove extremely beneficial for the U.S. when viewed in the context of Vietnam, costs of maintaining troops all over the world, and, above all, the attainment of nuclear parity with the United States by the Soviets. Second, detente could assure America of future political, economic, ideological, and cultural influence in the region. Third, closer contacts could possibly loosen the ties of the Eastern European nations from the Kremlin and encourage liberalization within the Eastern European regimes. Fourth, better relations with the Soviet bloc could enable greater trade with these countries. These motivations taken together were not always compatible and hence created dilemmas for American policymaking in the region. The Johnson and Nixon administrations desired a general lessening of tensions with the Soviets, yet were constrained by conflicting interests. Alan Jones summarizes the problems facing the United States in the attempt at opening dialogue with the East:

Characteristically, however, the American problem was one of balancing policy initiatives in different directions. Under some circumstances diplomatic overtures in Eastern Europe could well prove dangerous and counterproductive. The Nixon administration was hard-pressed to balance its regional and its worldwide interests. At one end of the policy spectrum, improvement in relations with Eastern Europe could not be allowed, by arousing Soviet suspicions, to jeopardize other American interests, above all a more general detente with the Soviet Union that could lead to major nuclear disarmament and lessen the danger of global conflicts; at the other end, the structure of American alliances could not be rashly compromised against the contingency of a Soviet "change of heart," a stiffening of the Kremlin's world policy.¹⁵²

This "balancing act" became even more precarious for a short time as Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* expanded and seemed to outrun American interests in the region, as well as the world per se. In the final analysis, however, *Ostpolitik* enabled increased opportunities for the United States to arrange a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviet-West German nonaggression treaty signed in August 1970 paved the way for a non-belligerent stance toward the FRG by the Soviets (the first time since the creation of West Germany), and opened new forums in which the

¹⁵²Alan M. Jones, Jr., *U.S. Foreign Policy In a Changing World* (New York: Davis McKay Company, Inc., 1974), p. 129.

United States could work towards detente. The numerous treaties and agreements signed in the following years all contributed to the recognition of both sides of the post-World War II status quo. Thus the process of detente was furthered by the actions of Brandt's government, and the treaties and conferences which followed allowed the superpowers to negotiate a number of important issues concerning post-World War II settlements, arms limitations, and human rights.¹⁵³

American policies during detente were based upon cooperation with the East without directly threatening the legitimacy of the communist institutions or undermining their authority. The status quo was the centerpiece of policy, and recognition of Soviet influence, postwar borders, and the German Democratic Republic became paramount in the negotiations. As a result, between 1968 and 1975 American policy toward the East succeeded in increasing mutual contacts -- economic, cultural, and political.

In the case of East Germany, the United States was forced to recognize the fact that there was another German nation, thereby emphasizing world order interests above idealistic desires for a free and democratic East Germany and, by doing so, enhancing the chances of success in the negotiations with the Soviets. Detente, therefore, illustrates the American inclination towards stability and world order in Central Europe. For example, even after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the process of detente and *Ostpolitik* continued almost without interruption, and, in reality, provided impetus for increased negotiations.

American policies continued into the late 1970's based upon detente with the Soviet Union. The Carter administration in the last half of the decade succeeded in negotiating SALT II and emphasized the human rights aspects of previous treaties and agreements; however, by the end of the decade detente was in decline as the Soviets and their proxies became involved in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. By 1979, it seemed that detente was in decline.

¹⁵³Some of the more important negotiations which followed were: (1) the West German-Polish treaty recognizing the Oder-Neisse border as the permanent Polish frontier signed in 1970; (2) the 1971 four-power agreement on the status of, and access to, West Berlin signed by the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union; (3) the Basic Treaty between the two Germanies which was signed in December 1972. This provided for mutual recognition, respect of each other's sovereignty, and the development of normal and peaceful relations; (4) the beginning of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in November 1972 (CSEF). This conference brought together 32 major players from within and without the WTO and NATO, and resulted in the Helsinki Final Accords in 1975, including the so-called Basket 3 on human rights; and (5) the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) in 1972.

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THE QUEST FOR REGIME LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY IN THE
GDR (GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC): THE DETERMINANT OF
POLICY(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

With the advent of the 1980's and the Reagan administration, the policy of "differentiation" has been emphasized.¹⁵⁴ This policy derives from the notion that Eastern Europe is something other than a monolith. The United States' bilateral relations with East Germany, as with other Eastern European nations, are based upon its unique and different situation (hence differentiation). Foreign policy behavior which exhibits some autonomy from the USSR and seems to parallel Western interests is more apt to be rewarded. In addition, any liberalization of the economy, culture, political structure, emigration, or human rights is also prone to receive favorable responses from the United States, such as the granting of most-favored nation treatment and export credits and guarantees. Although differentiation dates back to the 1940's, the Reagan Administration has reconfirmed the overall nature of past American policies in this regard.

US-GDR relations have gradually improved in the past few years with a number of important and unprecedented exchanges and visits.¹⁵⁵ The Reagan Administration's greater interest in the GDR reflects a recognition of the growing importance of East Germany in the Soviet bloc. However, American policies toward the FRG have not been ignored in this increased awareness of the GDR.

Specifically, President Reagan's policy has shown itself to consist of three main features: (1) no recognition of a lawful division of Europe and Germany; (2) acceptance and recognition of Eastern European diversity (and hence GDR uniqueness); and (3) encouragement of peaceful changes in political and social areas. These policy goals have aimed at evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. The administration has set certain conditions for improving relations with the SED regime (as with other countries):

Evidence of reciprocity. Individual countries must have the desire and ability to reciprocate in our relations and show sensitivity to U.S. interests.

Indications of a constructive policy in Europe, through the CSCE process and in bilateral relations with other European countries

¹⁵⁴"Differentiation" actually began in the 1940's, however, the Reagan Administration has standardized it, given it a name, and adopted it as its own.

¹⁵⁵Ronald D. Asmus, "The Schultz Visit To Eastern Europe," *Radio Free Europe Research* (RAD Background Report/4, 9 January 1986), pp. 4-5. Related issues which have been discussed during the 1980's include those dealing with settlement of American war claims.

Indications that individual governments are sensitive to the traditions and aspirations of their people

Willingness by governments to fulfill their obligations under human rights, economic, and other provisions of the CSCE Final Act.¹⁵⁶

Rhetorically, the Administration continues to attempt to separate East Germany from the Soviets as seen in December 1985 when Secretary of State George Schultz visited several Soviet bloc countries and stated:

. . . the division of Berlin, Germany, and Europe was "unnatural and inhumane" and that the United States did not recognize the incorporation of East Berlin, the GDR, or Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere of influence.¹⁵⁷

In summary, throughout the last 41 years, the United States has been forced to deal with the German question and the dilemmas it creates. American policies have been, for the most part, reactive to the Soviets and supportive of the West Germans. As the American national interests have been perceived to benefit from a change of policy such as occurred in the late 1960's and early 1970's, new and flexible policies have been implemented with the help of Western European allies, especially West Germany. Today, it is very difficult to analyze the policies of the United States in terms of just the GDR; all of Eastern Europe is involved in American policymaking. East Germany does, however, provide unique aspects and opportunities for American influence in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as will be demonstrated in the next section.

C. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND GDR L/S GOALS

In writing of U.S. policies in Eastern Europe, Bennett Kovrig states:

The historical experience of the United States in its dealings with East Central Europe is one of disappointed idealism and modestly rewarded pragmatism. Official policy has vacillated between activism and benign neglect, but at its core one finds the constant factor of revisionism -- of dissatisfaction with the political status quo of the region.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980's* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 October 1985), p. 559.

¹⁵⁷Ronald D. Asmus, "The Schultz Visit to Eastern Europe," p. 5.

¹⁵⁸Bennett Kovrig, "The United States: 'Peaceful Engagement' Revisited," in *The International Politics of Eastern Europe*, ed. Charles Gati (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 131.

This mix of idealism and pragmatism is extremely evident in U.S. policies in the GDR, and it contributes to the dilemma of, on the one hand, addressing idealistic national interests, while on the other, maintaining world order interests involved there.

The postwar division of Germany has forced the United States to confront a status quo it cannot idealistically condone or realistically change. The importance of the GDR to the USSR, including many Soviet "vital" national interests, creates a stalemate. To accomplish even limited goals, the United States must operate with this in mind. This, in turn, forces a tacit acceptance of the existing regime in East Germany and the realization that a stable regime may be more useful in pursuing American interests. Therefore, maintenance of a stable East Germany contributes to a stable Central Europe.

The national interests of the United States in East Germany can be demonstrated by placing them in a matrix which relates them to the four legitimacy/stability goals of the GDR. U.S. "interest" categories consist of *economic interests*, *ideological interests*, and *world order interests*:

1. *Economic Interests*- These include those which involve any commercial or financial links which affect American foreign trade and commerce.
2. *Ideological Interests*- These interests encompass all of those ideals and values which the United States (as a political culture) would prefer to occur in the GDR, to include individual freedom, democracy, free enterprise, etc. In addition, these regional goals contribute to the larger aim of containing Soviet communism.
3. *World Order Interests*- The maintenance of a stable and secure international environment in Central Europe is the main orientation of these national interests (consequently enhancing world stability).¹⁵⁹

In this context, how does the American national interest matrix relate to the four East German legitimacy/stability goals introduced in the last chapter? Figure 5.1 illustrates this relationship. The related U.S. national interest is identified as either positively or negatively influenced in the continued maintenance of the particular East German goal.

1. *GDR National Identity Goals*- The United States supports West German efforts at keeping the inter-German relationship open. This serves to prevent an evolution of a separate East German national identity among its people which, if realized, could harm American ideological interests by destroying the traditional cultural links with the FRG. However, world order interests would be positively affected if the growth of an East German socio-political identity continues; because this nationalism would render permanent the division of Germany -- a situation which serves American goals for regional stability. Economic interests in this aspect are not important factors.

¹⁵⁹Neuchterlein's "defense interests" have been subsumed into this category because in the case of East Germany, stability is also a defense-oriented interest for geo-strategic reasons.

| GDR L/S GOALS* | ECONOMIC | IDEOLOGICAL | WORLD ORDER |
|-------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| NATIONAL IDENTITY | N/A | - | + |
| SOVEREIGNTY | + | - | + |
| IDEOLOGY | N/A | - | + |
| SOCIAL POLICY | + | + | + |

* Legitimacy/Stability Goals
 + Positively influenced by continued L/S maintenance
 - Negatively influenced by continued L/S maintenance

Figure 5.1 U.S. Interests in GDR L/S Goals.

2. *GDR Sovereignty Goals*- Continued diplomatic recognition and relations with the GDR strengthens American leverage over some aspects of East German actions and provides assistance in aiding in West German demands. Since this recognition serves to legitimize the SED regime, it contributes to the maintenance of both East German stability and the current status quo of the East-West confrontation in Central Europe. This contributes to American world order interests, but detracts from American ideological interests. Economic interests now become involved because diplomatic recognition allows greater economic interaction and creates opportunities for increasing East German dependence on trade and technology from America and the West. Consequently, this allows some American influence in GDR domestic policies (although indirectly).
3. *GDR Ideology Goals*- American ideological interests are definitely not served by contributing to the maintenance of a Marxist-Leninist society in the GDR. However, world order interests are positively affected through the stability which results from the assurance that the Soviets will not actively intervene to stop any "counterrevolution" in East Germany.
4. *GDR Social Goals*- East German attempts at increasing the standards of living and meeting the needs of its citizens is a very important means for gaining support, as discussed in the chapter on domestic implements of legitimacy and stability. This goal influences all three American national interests. Economic interests are important because the United States can use financial and commercial "carrots" in the form of increased loans, western technology, or market access to affect desirable changes within both the domestic and foreign policy of East Germany (from the American perspective). This consequently enables a limited avenue to exert influence for resolving idealistic concerns of the United States, especially in the area of human rights. Lastly, world order interests are maintained because of the increased security and stability which is created for the East Germans through the growth of the standard of living and hence popular support; East German stability does not threaten Soviet interests, thus providing no motivations for increased Soviet activity in the region.

This rather simplistic analysis of the American interests in the maintenance of East German legitimacy today illustrates the importance of pragmatism in the final

development of U.S. foreign policy. The matrix shows that the American interests are "prioritized" and in the East German case, world order and security appear to be greater determinants of U.S. policy than are idealistic concerns. However, the matrix also provides a glimpse of the "tight rope" on which American foreign policy often treads; for, as the world order interests are pursued, the idealistic interests are not forgotten. This demonstrates the distinctive nature of the American pursuit of the ever-present compromise between the ideals of the political culture of the United States and the problematic context in U.S foreign policy.

D. U.S. POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE

In developing future policies concerning the German Democratic Republic, there are three things which affect all decisions in this regard: (1) the nature of overall East-West relations; (2) the political posture of America's European allies (especially West Germany); and (3) the internal development of the GDR itself. Since the United States' interests in the GDR are relative to other countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the status of the above factors will always contribute to current policy. Any American administration cannot interact with East Germany (or any other communist country) in a vacuum.

Given the importance to the United States of stability in Central Europe and the desire for liberalization of the communist countries there, what are the policy options available to the U.S.? First of all, any attempts to directly challenge Soviet power and influence in solving the German question could only produce a high risk of nuclear war, and overt disruptions of East German stability could possibly bring even greater Soviet intervention and penetration of GDR society. Since this paper has shown the importance of legitimacy to regime stability in East Germany, the United States must adopt policies which do not drastically damage the regime's legitimacy. Therefore, limited objectives contributing to long-range goals must be formulated.

Between absolute neglect on the one extreme and armed intervention on the other, there seem to be six possible approaches to U.S. relations with East Germany:

1. Hostile Separation
2. Peaceful Intervention
3. Aggressive Differentiation
4. Accommodation
5. Benign Aggression
6. Gradual Liberalization

Hostile Separation- This policy entails a complete pull-back from East Germany by the United States and, if possible, her allies (in all aspects -- politically, economically, and socially). This would place the full burden of the continued viability of East Germany on the Russians and reduce Western aid to the country. The aim of this policy would be to force the Soviets to reconsider their position there and, theoretically, make them more amenable to change for Western concessions; however, this policy would require the United States to give up what influence it now has in East Germany, an influence which has been gained slowly over a long period of time. In addition, the United States would be forced to "relive" the past as under the Hallstein Doctrine. The importance of East Germany to the FRG would make this policy all but impossible to successfully carry out without alienating West Germany.

Peaceful Intervention- This involves Western actions inside the country through propaganda, economic pressure, and diplomatic pressure to create tension in order to drain Soviet and SED resources in maintaining stability. A policy such as this would also make life for the people very uncomfortable and, at least, create instability and thus foster greater Soviet/SED control and repression.

Aggressive Differentiation- As in differentiation, this policy would concentrate on treating the GDR in a unique way; however, in this case, the primary purpose would be to create schisms between the SED and the Soviet Union through "carrot and stick" approaches without regard to stability concerns within the region. A degree of unrest, instability, and tension are viewed in this policy to be advantageous to the U.S. Because of the level of Soviet military presence in the country and the nature of the relationship between the SED and the CPSU, the chances for success would be extremely low, and the chances for a dangerous military confrontation would be high (on the whole, very disadvantageous).

Accommodation- Policies of modest and normal relations with the SED on all levels aimed toward maintenance of the status quo and regional stability could encourage the East Germans to feel more secure and improve their foreign relations posture towards the West. Economic and diplomatic relations would not be promoted or discouraged, but left alone to evolve naturally. The disadvantages of this policy include the unpalatable requirement for the West to accept the current situation in Eastern Europe in order to foster stability. It would also spell the complete abandonment of any

pretext to the future reunification of Germany, creating at the same time possible tensions within NATO (especially concerning the FRG).

Benign Aggression- This would entail a policy to address the humanitarian aspects of the present division of Germany. Emphasis would be placed on increases in visitation privileges, consumer-oriented trade, cultural exchanges, and sustained Western influence without challenging the status quo. Although Western influence could still affect the Soviet and SED hold on the country, any gains would be far outweighed by losses in the moral and political positions given up if this were implemented. It would require the West to accept more formally the unfavorable situation in Germany.

Gradual Liberalization- Another name for differentiation, this is the policy which the U.S. has pursued since the 1940's (as described earlier). The goal has always been to affect change in Eastern Europe (and East Germany) by providing favorable treatment to countries showing independence from Moscow without causing destabilization in the region.

If world order interests are paramount in Central Europe for the United States (as demonstrated in the matrix), and the stability of the GDR depends upon legitimacy and maintenance of the division of Germany, then a continuation of the policy of differentiation seems to be the correct way to attain U.S. long-range goals in the region. This policy stance provides the capability to address all three American national interests in Central Europe without causing tensions within NATO (the current situation withstanding). In the future, however, the United States must try to take advantage of the discord between Moscow and Berlin to reinforce behavior favorable to the West. Not only must the regime be the target of Western reinforcement, whether negative or positive, but the East German *people* must continue to be an important focus for Western propaganda and hence influence. In addition, Western credibility as perceived by the population of the GDR must be pursued. To better accomplish this, greater consultation and cooperation between the Western Allies is needed to limit disagreement over unilateral actions and prevent ill-feelings over policy outcomes.

Due to the constraints facing the United States when dealing with the GDR (i.e., ideology interests vs. world order interests), a modest and gradual approach to the liberalization of East Germany is required. Any instability within the GDR only

increases the chances for greater internal suppression and Soviet penetration. The United States must recognize the importance of legitimacy and stability to the SED regime and formulate policies accordingly. If world order is maintained, American policymakers can pursue second order interests through less threatening means and, in the process, attain long-term results. Just as the GDR must formulate policies within the spectrum of Soviet control, the United States must formulate her policies towards Central Europe with the East German quest for legitimacy and stability always in mind. Any irreparable damage to these vital interests of the SED regime could very well topple the delicate relationship which has evolved in Central Europe. The United States is thus required to pursue her national interests in East Germany within this constraining environment.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Socialist Unity Party's search for regime legitimacy and stability is a product of East Germany's unique situation in Central Europe, and the nature of the GDR's creation has forced the regime to continue to strive for these goals. Although East Germany shares common characteristics with other communist nations in the Warsaw Pact, its credibility dilemma contains two different obstacles to overcome; as Roland Smith writes:

Whereas in the other countries, the problem concerns only the form of the state and not its national identity, in the GDR the two questions are linked inseparably because the state justifies its existence by its socialist nature.¹⁶⁰

As a result, the SED's legitimacy and stability concerns are the driving factors in domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, these concerns are addressed through various policies which affect East German citizens from early childhood until death. The importance of economics in realizing legitimacy/stability goals will continue as a tool in legitimizing the regime and act as the primary measure of success (as perceived by the population as well as its leaders). In foreign affairs, regime concerns for maintaining stability (through legitimacy) are also determinants of policy as seen in the GDR's relationships with the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, West Germany, and the Third World.

Those instances where discord has arisen between the Soviet Union and East Germany over inter-German relations derive from the East German paranoic need to attain legitimacy. Relations with the FRG can almost exclusively be viewed in this context. Today, East Berlin's position on the inter-German relationship reflects East German anxieties, namely: recognition of separate GDR citizenship, the mutual exchange of ambassadors, abolishment of human rights monitoring, and the settlement of the Elbe river border contentions.¹⁶¹ The quest continues even into the SDI debate

¹⁶⁰Roland Smith, "Soviet Policy Toward West Germany," *Adelphi Papers*, Number 203 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1985), p. 6.

¹⁶¹These four points are part of the so-called Gera demands stated by Honecker in a speech in October 1980.

which has replaced INF as the major East-West issue, and the SED leadership is facing similar policy dilemmas this time around.

Relations with other Soviet bloc countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, fall in line with the legitimacy and stability concerns of the East German regime. This was demonstrated by the policies carried out by the GDR in 1968 and again in 1980-81. By analyzing the different goals which were pursued in these crises a basis for understanding East German decisionmaking becomes apparent. The East German involvement in the Third World demonstrates another means to build legitimacy and stability. Military, economic, and diplomatic ties with developing countries aids in attaining those legitimacy/stability goals outlined in this paper. Given the importance of these four goals to the SED regime, the traditional East German search for stability and legitimacy will continue to govern what *independent* foreign policy the GDR carries out in the future.

The circumstances leading to the creation of the GDR; its character; and its relationships create a complex situation for American policymakers. The conflict between U.S. ideological and strategic goals in the region are not easily resolved. The current policy of striking a balance of ideological and national security (world order) interests appears to be the most prudent, although greater care should be taken to identify future opportunities. The recognition of constraints on American power and influence in East Germany; the continued utilization of trade influence; support for inter-German relations; and restraint of policies which could destabilize the political structure of the GDR, all seem to contribute to a flexible and realistic approach. For the United States, the importance of legitimacy and stability to the GDR leadership provides a means to understand their motivations as well as a possible avenue to affect change, albeit subtly. The East German case illustrates the uniqueness of both states' national interests -- the GDR's reliance on a narrow set of goals and the United States' need to resolve seemingly incompatible objectives in a vitally important region.

The tremendous scope of internal and external policies created to build and consolidate legitimacy and stability in East Germany are implications of important political phenomena -- phenomena worth studying. As long as there remains two Germanies with two different sociopolitical systems, drastically influenced by the two superpowers, then the quest for SED legitimacy and regime stability will continue.

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